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PREFACE 
Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal have b~en the subjects of 
hundreds of works. Historians such as Arthur M. Sthlesinger, Jr., 
James MacGregor Burns, and William Leuchtenberg, have argued that the 
man and his program were liberal, while Paul Conkin, Barton J. Bern-
stein, and Howard Zinn have countered with the assertion that they 
were conservative. However, there has been no major effort to study 
these two primary themes as they related to the New Deal 1 s administra-
tive agencies, especially that of the National Recovery Administration. 
In addition, scholars have written little regarding the organization 
and influence of these agencies at the state level. If conservatism 
is defined as supporting and promoting the causes of special interest 
elites such as big business over those of the public or larger, broader 
based organizations, then the New Deal and the NRA must be classified 
as conservative. The recovery agency achieved short-term conservative 
ends, and the alliance between business and government has had long 
range conservative effects on American econbmics and politics. 
This thesis is a study bf the Natibnal Recovery Administration at 
both the national level and within the state of Oklahoma. It i:s a 
study of the men who created the NRA, how it "functioned, and who bene-
fited. The primary purpose of this study is to determine the influence 
business groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce and the American 
Petroleum Institute, had on the develbpment and operation of the NRA. 
To complete the story of the Blue Eagle it has been necessary to 
iii 
describe the creation of the recovery program and the codes of fair 
competition, the development of the NRA 1 s local, state and national 
organizational structure, and the effects and reaction that various 
interest groups had on these bodies. 
For this work I have investigated Congressional debates and 
hearings concerning the establishment and extension of the NRA, studied 
the NRA records available in the Oklahoma State University library, 
and Oklahoma City's Chamber of Corm:nerce, and examined _state and na.tion-
al newspapers for reaction to the Blue Eagle and its effects on the 
economic and political structure. In additi<m, I ~ave con_side:red 
' l 
biographies and autobiographies of the participand;, and general his-
tories of the New Deal and Oklahoma. 
The author wishes to thank Dr. Joseph .A. _Stout, Jr. , wh9 d.:i. rec_ted 
this- study and read the manuscript carefully. I also wish to e~p;ress 
my gratitude to Dr. Odie B. Faulk and Dr. Mich_ael ~. S~ith fot: _their 
critical comments on the final draft of _the thesis. Further th_a,nks ;ire 
rendered to Dr. Charles Dollar for his exte.nsiye help_ and encou;ragement 
in this student 1 s first year in graduate schoQl.. l ;:im also_ ind,ebted 
to Thomas Watts, Clayton Anderson, and Pau.1 B. Stt:asbaugh of .the 
Oklahoma City Chamber of Cotmnerce for_their ~ssistance and permission 
in using the NRA record located there. 
I must end with a special word of love and thap.ks to my wife_, Linda, 
who through diapers, frustration, and ;:inguish,_ typec;\ _the rnanus~r;i.pt _and 
provided the love and encouragement that made this thesis possible and 
worthwhile. 
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INTRCDUCTION: THE BIRTH OF THE EAGLE 
Tuesday, October 30, 1929, dawned over Oklahoma cool and cloudy 
with rain in the forecast. Whatever storms struck the Sooner state 
that day, none matched the tornado that swept through Wall Street, 
casting aside the so-called New Era and bringing a national depression 
more devastating than any the country had known previously. Before 
that fateful day became history, more than six million shares of stock 
had been sold, and economic choas had begun. Despite the optimism of 
newspaper repbrts, this was only a prelude to the greatest world de-
pression of modern history. 1 The~ York Times industrials bottemed 
in 1929 at 224 with such stocks as Standard Oil of New Jersey register-
ing fifty, U. S. Steel, 262, and General Motors, ~eventy-three. By 
July, 1932, the nadir of the depression, the industrials had crashed to 
fifty-eight followed by Standard Oil below twenty, U. S. Steel at 
twenty-two and General Motors, eight. 2 But the plummeting stock mar-
ket directly affected only the few who owned shares; it was the result-
ing gloom that descended over business and the widespread unemployment 
which shattered the lives of millions of Americans. 
By 1929 American manufacturing had reached the highest profit and 
productivity levels in the history of any industrial nation. Industry 
had expended more than $14 billion in salaries and wages and had pro-
duced goods valued at nearly $68 billion during that year. But the next 
three years plunged these figures to disastrous lbws. By 1933 wages 
and salaries had dipped to $9.5 billion, and the value of industrial 
1 
2 
products had slipped to $30.5 billion. 3 The decline in industrial 
output adversely affected even agricultural Oklahoma. 
In the Sooner state, over 31,000 Oklahomans were working in over 
1600 industrial establishments. Although not a large percentage of 
the population, these laborers and businesses carried a weight far 
greater than their nurµbers because of the products they manufactured. 
The state lost over eleven million dollars in salaries and wages in a 
ten year period beginning in 1929 as well as over $100 million in 
4 
manufactured goods. This seriously affected all Oklahomans; everyone 
had to pay, either directly or indirectly, for industrial decline. 
The affects of this explosive economic downturn can be seen even 
more clearly in the figures on unemployment. In 1;929 about 1.8 
million Americans were unemployed, comprising some 4.7% of the work 
force, and affecting 600 ,000 families. By 1933 those figures had 
plunged to all-time lows: 12.8 million workers had lost their jobs, 
or 32.7% of the work force, which affected nearly six million families? 
6 Of the unemployed, some 354,000 were from the Sooner state. 
But these dull, dry facts and figures only give the depression a 
surrealistic coating blurring the real tragedy of scarred human lives. 
In most areas of the country the depression passed like a slow, creep-
ing shadow across the land. First came the cutback, _work for only 
two or three days at a time; then the layoff descended and walking the 
streets searching for a job became a nightmare of rejection. Finally, 
breadlines arrived bringing the embarrassing necessity of accepting a 
handout to survive. Living became just existing. Hardships plagued 
most people, for when shoes wore out the only recourse was to line the 
bottom with cardboard or cotton to make them last as long as possible. 
3 
When the harsh winters arrived people wrapped their feet in gunny 
sacks and stuffed their shirts with newspapers to keep out the merci-
less wind and cold. And the scars that appeared never completely 
healed: One victim of the depression recalled, 111 now have twenty 
times more shirts than I need, because all during that time, shirts 
were something I never had. 117 The depression despair brought fear 
and irrationality. At no other time in American history have extre-
mists had such appeal as in the 1930 1 s. Radicals of the right and the 
left, from Father Coughlin, Huey P. Long, and the American Bund to 
William Foster, Norman Thomas, and the Communist party, drew millions 
of followers from the destitute and the hopeless. Even Communist 
Russia looked good to unemployed Americans. In 1931 when the Soviet 
Union caUed for 6000 skilled workers who were dissatisfied with con-
ditions in the United States, more than 100,000 Americans applied for 
h . b 8 t e JO S• 
Oklahomans faced a dual disaster in the depression. On the one 
hand industry was failing and jobs were scarce in the towns and cities, 
and on the other the parched winds of one of the worst droughts in the 
area's history literally blew away thousands of farms. This was the 
terror of the Dust Bowl so clearly described in John Steinbeck's The 
Grapes of Wrath. Thousands fled the state for the paradise of Cali-
fornia and the ones who remained struggled to scratch an existence out 
of the clinging red clay or retreated to the cities to take refuge. 
Oscar Ameringer of Oklahoma City, testifying before a Congressional 
Committee in February 1932, described the conditions he had witnessed 
in his home state. He told of numerous bales of cotton rotting in the 
fields because the pickers could not survive on the 35¢ paid per 100 
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pounds. Ameringer continued that this disaster was pervasive through-
out the state, with 70% of Oklahoma's farmers unable to pay the inter-
. h . 9 est on t eir mortgages. Even the oil industry suffered serious 
economic setbacks. By 1929 the opening of new fields prompted over-
production in Seminole, Oklahoma City, and East Texas, and reduced the 
price of crude oil to one cent per barrel. Therefore, only two years 
after the oil boom 1 s beginning the major companies began to cutback on 
the number of drilling sites and the amount of land leased for wells. 10 
Neither did the state escape radical, violent solutions to the crisis. 
Following the actions of the unemployed in neighboring Arkansas, where 
500 persons rioted over the shortage of food, Oklahomans, too decided 
to protest. On January 20, 1931 some 200 men and women raided a gro-
cery store in Oklahoma City. The press described the raid as a "hunger 
riot. 11 Moreover, prominent state politicians such as Governor-elect 
William H. Murray and Democratic Senator Elmer Thomas predicted more 
food riots, and even violent revo~ution if something were not done to 
help Oklahoma's farmers, businessmen, and unemployed laborers. 11 
Still, no one in government or industry knew what to do to reduce 
depression suffering. The state's relief responsibilities fell with 
no central coordination until 1931 on each county. The county·agencies, 
and finally, even the State-wide emergency relief board, could not 
manage the overwhelming demands for help. The $300,000 appropriated 
for relief the first year could not quench the thirst of the dusty 
12 Sooner unemployed. And the later efforts of Gov. William "Alfalfa 
Bill" Murray, though they went further, were still insufficient. 
Murray prevented police from arresting the unemployed, secured a more 
progressive tax law, and established relief stations. (Unfortunately, 
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the Governor had to be relatively cautious in his legislative programs 
lest he face the fate of two of his recent predecessors--impeachment 
at the hands cf a factionalized Democratic state legislature. ) 13 But 
even these meager efforts at relief for the jobless could not help 
the ailing industries that had laid them off, nor the drought-stricken 
farms that had driven them to the city. It became apparent early, at 
the local level, that federal aid was essential fer recovery. Only 
the national goverrunent had, or could acquire, the funds necessary for 
massive industrial, agricultural, and unemployment relief. Only a 
centralized, national campaign could bring American economic beliefs 
into the modern world. By 1932, depression had crushed the old con-
cepts of laissez-faire capitalism and rugged ind.ividualism and had 
prepared the way for state-welfare capitalism and a more cooperative 
society. But the period 1929-1932 told an agonizingly different story. 
No single figure of his time seemed more capable nor more appro-
priate for the White House than Herbert Clark Hoover. The former 
engineer and self-made millionaire seemingly brought to.the Presidency 
all that was best in American individualism. He had served as director 
of the food relief program for Belgium and was Food Administrator 
during World War I. During the 1920's his brilliant organizational 
ability took the Department of Commerce by storm. Yet his sincere 
belief in "rugged· individualism" while bringing him to the Presi<iency, 
also laid the ground work for his eventual downfal.1 in .1932_. H~rbert 
Hoover acted tnore extensively and used his office more powerfully to. 
end the economic woes of the nation than had any of his predec;:esso:r;s. 
Yet he could not generate confidence among the p~ople, nor would his 
principles let him follow through on initial programs that a more 
flexible Franklin D. Roosevelt made into the New Dea1. 14 
Hoover's anti-depression program attacked the crisis from two 
angles. On the one hand the President and other spokesmen for the 
Administration continually made positive statements about prosperity 
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being right around the corner. But when Americans rounded the corner 
and only saw worse conditions ahead, the intended psychological uplift 
became a growing tailspin Of fear, despair, and anger. On the other 
hand the President employed the power of his office to promote a 
variety of relief measures. He created the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation to save banks and businesses through emergency loans; he 
attacked foreclosures by developing Federal Home Loan banks; he tried 
using the fiscal power of the government to aid business by lowering 
the rediscount rate and the income tax. Yet he counterbalanced these 
positive measures with equally negative ones. He refused to weaken 
the moral fiber of the unemployed by providing them with food purch-
ased with federal money. His dedication to a balanced budget led him 
to cut Federal salaries, fire 6000 postal employees, and persistently 
fight appropriations for federal relief. Moreover, by raising interest 
rates to help preserve the gold standard, Hoover made it increasingly 
difficult for banks to get money, and therefore many closed their 
15 doors forever. Thus to millions of Americans the Great Depression 
became Hoover's depression. The police who came to evict them from 
their farms, the foreman who delivered the news of a layoff, the local 
relief authorities who did not have enough funds to help them support 
their hungry families, all became direct agents of Herbert Hoover. 
Even the shanty-towns, where the jobless slept in leaky huts made of 
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tin or cardboard, amid garbage, waste and disease, tarried the Presi-
dent 1 s name, "Hoovervilles. 11 By November 1932, Hoover had completely 
lost the confidence and support of more than twenty-two million 
Americans, who, through the ballot box, turned to a new man, a new 
administration, and hopefully a New Deal. 
Winning the election of 1932 demonstrated to a weary public 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's tremendous political skill. In one way the 
campaign startled the electorate with brilliah flashes of innovation. 
Roosevelt broke tradition from the very beginning by flying to Chi-
cago to accept the nomination. And in the anti-climatic moments 
between victory and nomination he ended the campaign with equal 
flair by appointing Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, the first 
woman ctibinet member. Yet the careful observor had difficulty filter-
ing a solid program out of the waters of political oratory. Roosevelt 
juggled advisors and ideas like a master circus performer •. Therefore, 
even though each major speech was dedicated to a major topic, (Topeka-
agriculture, Seattle-attack on high tariffs, San Francisco-regulatory 
rates of federal government) the structure of the New Deal was skel-
etal at best, even to the trained political observer. The President 
aptly described the character of the New Deal in a speech at Ogle-
thorpe University in Atlanta, Georgia, on May 22, 1932. There he 
declared: "The country needs and, unless I mistake its temper, the 
country demands bold, persistant experimentation. It is common sense 
to take a method and try it: if it fails, admit it frankly and try 
another. But above all, try something. 1116 
Try something, try anything, this was the spirit of the New Deal 
as it manifested itself from 1932 to 1940, and especially as it 
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appeared irt its first on hundred days. From March 9 to June 15, 1933, 
Roosevelt peppered the nation with a shotgun blast of legislation 
designed to cure the nation's economic ills. The E~ergency Banking 
Act of March 9 extended federal aid to private bankers, making it 
possible for them to reopen after the Bank Holiday. The creation of 
the Civilian Conservation Corps on March 31 provided jobs for unem-
ployed young men artd insured the preservation of certain of the 
nation's vital resources. Using the Federal Emergency Relief Act of 
May 12 Harry Hopkirts managed a national relief system which was 
budgeted one-half dollars for its first year's work. The Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, established on May 12, established a nation-
al farm policy, including allotments to restrict acreage, a tax on 
processors of agricultural commodities, and a provision to pay farmers 
who agreed to limit production. This bill also contained an amendment 
which Oklahoma's Senator Elmer Thomas proposed giving the President 
power to inflate the dollar by remonitizing silver or altering the 
gold content of the dollar. Vitally important to citizens of the 
Sooner state was the Emergency Farm Mortgage Act of May 12, which 
provided federally insured loans for refinancing farm mortgages and 
the Home Owners Loan Act of June 13, which supplied the same credit 
for home mortgages. On May 18 the Congress established the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, art innovative attempt at federally funded and 
managed power and flood control. The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 
June 16 divorced commercial artd investment banking and guaranteed 
b nk d . 17 a epos1ts. This potpourri of measures was the New Deal in 1933. 
Some parts conservative and traditional, other liberal and innovative, 
the legislation of the Hundred Days attacked the depression from all 
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sides. This flurry of action, if it did nothing else, created an image 
of an administration on the move, sharply contrasting with the apparent 
stagnation of the Hoover programs. Yet the image of recovery and its 
reality were entirely different, and making the two coincide was one 
of the most difficult tasks that Roosevelt faced. 
No more significant item in Roosevelt's shopping list of anti-
depression measures demonstrated this conflict between image and 
reality than did the National Recovery Administration. The NRA, Title 
I of the National Industrial Recovery Act, was designed to be the 
principal weapon in Roosevelt's battle against the depression, but two 
factors seriously hampered its effectiveness. The first of these was 
the importance of its image-making nature whereby support for the 
President's programs became the only patriotic position to hold, ex-
cluding all other alternatives; and the second was the conservative-
business orientation of the key people involved at both the national 
and local level which prevented fulfillment of key provisions of the 
act such as Section 7A on union organization and collective bargaining, 
minimum price levels, and those covering wages and hours. Instead of 
a way to end the depression, the NRA became a means by which business 
consolidation and monopoly could be effected at the expense of the 
worker, the consumer, and the small independent businessman. This 
was accomplished with the creation of a business-government alliance 
which lasted through depression in the Thirties, war in the Forties, 
and prosperity in the Fifties and Sixties. 
The process of creating a bill to promote industrial recovery was 
a complex one, beginning well before Senator Robert Wagner introduced 
it in Congress in May 1933. The development of the NRA clearly 
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illustrated the diverse conglomeration of ideas and. individuals at 
work that persisted throughout the years Roosevelt occupied the White 
House. Initially there existed three proposals for the bill. The 
first emerged from the office of Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor, 
and called for a tripartite board representing labor, management, 
and the government which would have the power to impose minimum wage 
provisions and grant limited exemptions from the requirement of a 30-
hour week. The Secretary of Labor might also have the power to impose 
machine-hour limitations on industries. These suggestions encountered 
the strong opposition of business, forcing the administration to con-
ceive a second plan. Coming from the pens of Raymond Moley and Hugh 
Johnson, this scheme suggested suspension of the anti-trust laws·,. 
empowering the President to authorize agreements dealing with compe-
tition and labor practices, and federal licensirig to in_sure compli-
ances. At the same time Senator Wagner and Secretary of_ Commerce 
John Dickinson were writing a third draft. This proposal called for 
a combination of public works; industrial loans, and industrial_ self-
government through trade-associations. On May 10 the three. groups_ 
met at the White House and reached a comprOmise which retaiped sowe-
th . f . 1 d 18 ing or everyone invo ve • Unfortunately, for later worlte:rs in 
the NRA, this process created a monumental administrative headache 
which frequently pleased none and angered ail. 
The wrangle o .. ·er the NRA did not end with the meeting 9f Ml:!.y JO, 
but extended and increased as it went into Congress. l.n:tro.duced as 
bill number H.R. 5755 on May 11, 1933, the act took a remarkably brief 
one month to pass through both committee hearings (Senate_Co!lllaj.ttee 
on Finance and House Committee on Ways and Means) and floor debate. 
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However brief, the month generated extremely intense arguments, both 
for and against the legislation. 
During the Committee hearings before House Ways and Means and 
Senate Finance almost everyone favored the bill being proposed to 
promote industrial recovery, if for widely varying reasons. Business-
men such as Harry L. Harri~an, President of the Chamber of Commerce, 
R. P. Lamont of the American Iron and Steel Institute, and James Emery 
of the National Association of Manufacturers recognized the need for 
federal control, at least to the extent of ending "cutthroat compe-
ti ti on," although they inf9rmally opposed the provisions favoring 
labor. Union representatives such as John L. Lewis of the United Mine 
Workers and William Green, President of the American Federation of 
Labor desired the bill for just those articles which recognized labor's 
right to collective bargaining. Oil men, in particular, appeared to 
support the NIRA as a means of aiding their seriously ill patient. 
Representative Dennis w. Marland of Oklahoma favored the bill because 
it would control production and thereby protect the petroleum industry. 
Jack Ballock of the Independent Petroleum Association wanted federal 
guidance through the codes, hoping that this would end the increasing 
tendency toward monopoly. Opposition in the hearings came mostly from 
those who thought the bill was not strong enough. An example was 
BertJamin Marsh from the People's Lobby of Washington, D. C. Marsh 
wanted the government to control wages, interest, profits_,, rent, and 
· 1 . 19 retai prices. Though few came to the hearings, more opponents to 
the NIRA appeared as the bill moved onto the floor of Congress. 
The opposition to the NIRA, mostly Republicans, raised haunting 
specters of a subtle overthrow of the American Constitution and system 
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of government. Representative Harry Ransley, Republican from Pennsyl-
vania, warned that this bill "Russianized" the American economy and 
ended American freedom. A fellow Republican,Perlnsylvania Rep. James 
Beck, agreed with his colleague, declaring that the NIRA established 
an unconstitutional despotism to reign over the United States. Rep. 
Carl Mapes, Republican from Michigan, raised the possible horror of 
an American Adolf Hitler, as he compared R.R. 5755 to the bill that 
made Der Feuhrer dictator Of Germany. Besides, he also believed that 
the bill was too expensive to justify the anticipated .results. Other 
Congressmen raised less theatric and more practical objections to the 
bill. Rep. Joseph Martin, Republican from Massachusetts, attacked the 
vagueness of t4e bill, fearing possible Presidential or administrative 
misinterpretation. And Rep. Fred Britten, Republican from Illinois, 
questioned the raise in taxes on salaries up to $10&000 without a 
corresponding increase for those over that amount. There were even 
some Democrats against H.R. 5755. Rep. Malcolm Tarver of Georgia 
objected to the bill's threat to states rights, which forewarned of 
later Southern response to certain aspects of the New Dea1. 20 
However, most Democrats and even some Republicans supported the 
NIRA during the debates. Proponents of the act stressed the 4ire 
situation at hand which demanded drastic, innovative measures. Rep._ 
Edward Pou, Demoract from North Carolina, admitted, during his intro-
ductory remarks, that this act established a benign dictatorship over 
industry. Pou's Democratic colleague from the same state, Rep. Robert 
Doughton agreed with this argument, calling the bill mandatory in ~~at 
time of great emergency. Rep. Clyde Kelly, Republican frox:n Pennsyl-
vania, described H.R. 5755 as the best means available, within the 
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limitations of the Constitution and American tradition, for handling· 
the crisis of depression. Another Republican, Rep. Harold Knutsen of 
Minnesota, saw the act as the salvation of the small businessman, 
while Democrat Rep. Samuel Hill of Washington believed that it created 
fair competition thereby supporting the purpose of the antitrust laws. 
Democrats also made more general, partisan appeals in behalf of H.R. 
5755 such as that of Rep. John O'Connor of New York, which called for 
a united Democratic front behind their leader, Franklin D. Roosevelt. 21 
Generally, for Congressmen supporting the NIRA, debate was an exercise 
in trading amendments and changes which were personal or state prefer-
ences. No state had any more interest in this than did oil-producing 
Oklahoma. 
The solid Democratic delegation from the Sooner state generally 
supported the NIRA with their only restrictions related to contrcil of 
the petroleum industry. Most of Oklahoma's Congressmen agreed with 
James v. McClintic, Seventh District Representative from Snyder, when 
he declared that the bill was essential to provide jobs for a desperate 
people. But McClintic also stated his opposition to a proposed in• 
crease in the gasoline tax, typifying the delegation's concern with 
22 that product. Sooner Senators also demonstrated this concern through 
two amendments to H.R. 5755. Senator Thomas Gore of Oklahoma City pro-
posed an addition to the bill which would have eliminated the increase 
. h l" 23 in t e gaso 1ne tax. Senator Elmer Thomas of Medicine Park sugges-
ted an amendment which would have granted the President the power to 
regulate the production of crude oil. 24 Both of these efforts failed, 
which was probably the primary reason that the delgation split on 
the final vote. 
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On May 26, two weeks and a day after its introdcution, H.R. 5755 
came to a vote in the House of Representatives. There it passed over-
whelmingly with 325 votes in favor, seventy-six in opposition, and 
twenty-eight members not voting. On June 6, the Democratic Senate 
concurred with fifty-eight votes in favor, twenty-four in opposition, 
and fourteen not voting. The Sooner delegation split six-three-two; 
Senator Thomas and Representatives McClintic, Jed Johnson, William 
Hasting, Tom McKeown, and Fletcher Swank cast ballots for the NIRA; 
Senator Thomas Gore and Representatives Will Rogers and Wilburn 
Cartwright voted against the bill. Two Congressmen were absent from 
the balloting, Wesley Disney and E.W. Marland. 25 On June 10 and 13, 
respectively, the House and Senate agreed to a conference report on 
the bill, and on June 16, the National Industrial Recovery Act went 
to the White House for President Roosevelt's signature. 26 
The final provisions of the bill, with very few limitations, 
granted the President extensive power over industry, labor, and the 
economy. The NIRA contained three titles, the last two concerned 
with public works and appropriations, and the first detailing in-
dustrial self-regulation and codes of fair competition. Title II 
authorized the President to create an Administration of Public Works 
which was to establish a program of federally-sponsored employment. 
With a budget of $3,300,000 this Administration created jobs through 
the construction of highways and public buildings, conservation of 
natural resources, slum-clearance, and any other type of employment 
the President deemed necessary. The funds for this part of the act 
were to come from the new tax on capital stock and excess profits. 
The federal government levied one-tenth of one per cent on the 
declared value of a company's stock and excess profits over 
twelve and a half per cent were taxed at a rate of five per cent 
per annum. 
Despite the radical nature of such extensive public works to 
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the American tradition, by far the most controversial and widely 
publicized provisions of the act were in Title I. Here Congress 
granted the President the power to create any agencies necessary to 
promote industrial recovery. Roosevelt also received authority to 
approve codes of fair competition drawn up by industrial groups or 
trade associations which he considered equitable, truly represen~ative 
and not intended to create or promote a monopoly. Few conditions had 
been imposed on the codes except those covering labor standards. 
Section 7A required that every coded industry grant their employees 
the right of collective bargaining, freedom from yellow-dog contracts, 
and fair conditions of employment, including maximum hours and minimum 
wages. Other important provisions of Title I included Section 5 
exempting the codes from prosecution under the antitrust laws, 
Section 8 providing that the bill would not .modify or alter the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act, and Section 3E which allowed the President 
to restrict imports which adversely affected any coded industry. 
Especially important to Oklahoma was Section 9 concerning regulation 
of oil Under this provision the President could regulate pipeline 
companies and halt the interstate transportation of oil produced above 
the limit preseribed by state laws. 27 
This, then, was the act which created the National Recovery Ad-
ministration. H.R. 5755 provided Roosevelt with a catch-all piece of 
enabling legislation which he could mold to his own image of recovery. 
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However flexible, it also represented the ideas of a wide variety of 
pressure groups including labor, big business, and small merchants. 
This constituted the NRA's biggest problem and major failure. Despite 
a brilliantly organized propaganda campaign to enlist support for the 
Blue Eagle, the groups to be satisfied were too diverse for the 
established machinery to organize a reconciliation of interests; 
besides, with its business domination, there was a serious question 
as to whether the NRA really desired such a reconciliation. Oklahoma's 
promotion campaign for the NRA and the reaction to it illustrate 
these problems clearly--Oklahoma reflected, nearly perfectly, the 
success and the failure of the National Recovery Administration. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE EAGLE'S FLIGHT 
Bold, persistent expe'rimentation had been Roosevelt 1 s battle cry 
in the campaign of 1932. Something new and different had to be tried 
to cure the ills of a depression-weary nation; something that called 
for and used the expanding powers of the Federal Government and es-
pecially those of the executive branch; something that would inspire 
and meet the needs of sick business, the hungry unemployed, and a 
disgruntled and grtunbling middle class. From all appearances the 
National Industrial Recovery Act met these needs very effectively. 
As an enabling act, it empowered· the chief executive virtually to 
dictate the nation's economy with few congressional controls or guide-
lines. By establishing public works programs to alleviate the vast 
unemployment eating at the heart of the economy the limited controls 
provided for cooperation with business. Moreover, the bill detailed 
only a skeletal structure for carrying out its provisions. After June 
16, the responsibility for the development of an organization to ful-
fill the purpose of the NIRA rested solely in the hands of President 
Roosevelt. The NRA became something old and something new, drawing on 
traditional, tried formulas and applying them through essentially con-
servative leadership. Yet it created an all-encompassing bureaucracy 
and the greatest attempt at peace-time economic planning in American 
history. 
President Roosevelt and his advisors did not create a new type 
of administrative agency in the NRA; rather they drew on their more 
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recent experience with planned economics, the War Industries Board of 
World War I. The WIB already had established a foundation upon which 
the NRA could be constructed. The board had utilized joint governmen~ 
business cOilmlittees designed to solve war-time problems and coordinate 
economic activities. Cooperation and coordination were two of the 
purposes of the code authorities under the NRA. In both cases the 
u. S. Chamber of Commerce and industrial trade associations led in 
rallying businessmen to the cause. The War Industries Board had pro-
mated its controlled economy ~hrough a gigantic public relations cam-
paign. Included was permission to display signs and insignia for 
those who cooperated with conservation efforts. The NRA blitzed the 
nation with an even more extensive propaganda effort, artd the Blue 
Eagle sticker became the sign of patriotism and support for the New 
Deal. Even many of the personnel in the NRA, especially in the Pub-
licity Division, had propaganda experience dating from World War I. 
Charles Horner had been an organizer of the Liberty Loan drives, and 
in 1933, became Director of Publicity for the NRA. Lewis Adler pro~ 
mated Liberty Loans and thereby gained experience as a propagandist; 
. 1 
under the New Deal he became head of the NRA Speaker's Bureau. 
The appointment of General Hugh Johnson as administrator of the 
recovery agency was the most significant direct link to the WIB and 
the experience of World War I. The blustering ex-calvary man from 
Alva, Oklahoma, had helped organize the draft during World War I, and 
also had served as liason between the Army and the WIB. During the 
1920 1 s he had served as general counsel to the Moline Plow Company . 
maintaining his contacts with business. In 1927 he left tha.t projec.t 
and went to New York to work for Bernard Baruch. There Raymond Maley 
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searched and found the man to help write an industrial recovery bill 
acceptable to the business community. 2 While the NRA was on Capitol 
Hill, Johnson rarely, if ever, rested~ Constantly in motion, he 
coaxed the bill through Republican gunfire in Congress, launched con-
ferences with businessmen on code makin&, and prepared and staffed 
the organization that became the National Recovery Administration. 3 
At first Johnson was authoritarian, handpicking the men and women 
who administrated the program. Assisting Johnson was the NRA's chief 
counsel Donald Richberg. Richberg, a progressive labor lawyer who had 
served as attorney for the Railroad Brotherhoods, now ferreted out 
legal loop-holes written into the proposed codes of fair competitin. 
He also served as an important advisor to the President, providing 
the latter with significant information about the inside operation of 
the industrial recovery agency. 4 Johnson appointed an old associate 
from the Moline Plow Company, Col. Robert w. Lea, to the position 
of Assistant Administrator for Industry. Lea had administrative exper-
ience from his work in the Purchase, Storage, and Traffic Division of 
the General Staff during World War I. Lea's bureaucratic opposite, 
Assistant Administrator for Labor was Edmond F. Mcbrady, a former A. 
F. of L. lobbiest, chairman of the labor division of the Liberty Loan 
Drives, and later, Assistant Secretary of Labor. Alvin Brown served 
as the NRA 1 s executive officer. He had experience as former chief 
clerk to the Provost Marshal General and as an executive of Moline 
Plow. Acting as an overseer of these men and a behind-the-scenes 
power in the administration was Miss Frances Robinson, the General's 
secretary and assistant. Other key personnel included William H. 
Davis, a former legal advisor to the War Department, serving in the 
vitally important post of National Compliance Director, Mary Rumsey, 
daughter of E. H. Harriman, and the old-line reformer Frederic Howe 
who headed the Consumer's Advisory Division. 5 These men and women 
directed an organization responsible for writing or passing judgment 
on codes, seeing that business carried out federal regulations, and 
protecting the consumer, the worker·, and the businessman from the 
effects of unfair competition. 
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By June 16, 1933, when the NRA became law, General Johnson had 
created a national framework for the recovery administration. He'and 
his appointed staff now became involved in a three-fold task designed 
to minister to an ailing industrial complex. As one of these tasks, 
the administrators had to organize the national framework with state 
and local recovery boards and organizations. A second task included 
an intensive, highly patriotic propaganda campaign designed to bring 
public support for the Blue Eagle and those who di~played that emblem 
and to direct public antagonism against those who opposed the NRA. 
But the major and ongoing problem the New Dealers faced was the crea-
tion of the codes on which their entire apparatus depended. 
The codemaking process began even while Congress debated the bill 
establishing the NRA. Anticipating passage of the legislation, busi-
nesses began preparing preliminary codes which the new Administration 
would judge. By July 31, 1933, 209 industries had submitted their 
requests. However, despite the National Association of Manufacturers 
pamphlet, "A Model Code for Self-Governing Industries under the Nat-
ional Industrial Recovery Act," the forms submitted displayed little 
uniformity. Seeing unending chaos unless some order was imposed from 
the federal level, Johnson ordered the creation of a Code Standardiza-
23 
tion Group to write an official NRA "Model Code." Issued on November 
6, 1933, the "Model Code" established a uniform outline on which in-
dustry could base its submitted codes. This model included articles 
concerning maximwn hours, minimwn wages, child labor, the required 
provisions on labor from Section 7A, rules governing the code authority 
and trade practices, as well as various other minimum code provisions. 
Unfortunately this recommendation came late in 1933 after many codes 
had already been drafted, including those for nine of the ten principal 
industries. As a result most of the industrial power of the nation 
was governed under codes which had been created haphazardly and were 
1 d b . . . 6 p ague y 1ncons1stenc1es. 
The actual codemaking process was a complex one made even more 
difficult by the flood of code requests and their unexpected variety. 
Each industry devised a proposed code which it submitted to the NRA 
for approval. These preliminary drafts then went through a multi-
staged examination during which the Code Analysis Division carefully 
scrutinized the docwnents. This body did a statistical study of the 
applicant's information to determine if their group truly was represen-
tative of the industry. Next, the request went to the Control Divi-
sion where it was assigned to a Deputy Administrator. The choice of 
an administrator was a vitally important step as this man presided 
over the code hearings; NRA policy frequently varied from one Deputy 
Administrator to the next. The real bargaining between government, 
business, and labor began with the preliminary conferences. During 
these meetings the NRA officials put the code requests in an acceptable 
form for the public hearings. The Deputy Administrator advised on 
sections to be included or omitted, and clearly illegal or unacceptable 
provisions. The next-to-the-last stage, the public hearing, brought 
the NRA into the limelight where it could demonstrate its strength 
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and wisdom. However, these meetings did not elicit a convincing 
presentation of evidence nor a close scrutiny of the codes' provisions. 
Instead the various interest groups drew their lines of battle for 
the more blatant post-hearing bargaining. In this final step, the NRA 
attempted to balance the demands of these groups into an acceptable 
final code. In some cases this balancing proved impossible and the 
code was turned over to some administrator who wrote the last draft. 
Once the administration approved the code by either of these last 
procedures, it went to the President for his signature, making it a 
binding, federal law. 7 
Johnson saw the first task in those early summer months, as get• 
ting the ten big industries (textiles, coal, petroleum, steel, auto-
mobiles, lumber, garments, wholesale trade; retail trade, and construc-
tion) under the Blue Eagle. The administration accomplished this in 
3 months, but not without an intensive struggle in several important 
cases. Steel opposed the labor provisions of their _code; Henry Ford 
balked at losing his independence to the government, holding up the 
code for automobiles; its regional divisions and a bloody antagonism 
between management and labor split coal. In each of these instances, 
the administration used a combination of concession and coercion to 
bring the industries into line: presidential pressure on steel and 
coal, concessions on price policy with steel, and organizing the auto 
industry without Ford. 8 No business illustrated the initial code-
making procedure more clearly than oil. The petroleum industry had 
been plagued by many difficulties and its stability was vital to 
Oklahoma and its economy. 
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Oil men and the oil-producing states had cried long and hard for 
federal regulation of the petroleum industry. Unrestrained, the pro-
duction of oil had increased at a tremendous rate in the ten year 
period from 1920 to 1930. Domestic production of crude oil had risen 
from about 450 million barrels in in 1920 to nearly 900 million bar-
rels by the end of the decade. The arrival of the depression with its 
corresponding decline in demand, added to overproduction, driving 
prices in 1930 from $1.30 a barrel to only two cents a barrel in 1931. 
An unequaled abandonment of wells accompanied the decline in prices. 
There were 21,603 closings in 1931 alone. The various oil companies 
and petroleum-producing states attempted, largely unsuccessfully, to 
control production and other aspects of the industry. On September 
13, 1931, the governors of Oklahoma, Kansas, and Texas signed an in-
formal agreement establishing quotas for the production of oil in 
each state. However, these measures fell short of accomplishing their 
goals, largely because individuals, companies, and states complied 
minimally. (California, one of the largest oil producers, steadfastly 
refused to regulate her production. This made it extremely difficult 
for the other states to enforce their own laws.) Also, there was an 
absence of an overall, centralized enforcement authority. Recognizing 
the need for some type of control most oil men looked to Washington 
and the NRA for a cure for their industry's illness. Belatedly the 
Roosevelt administration recognized the state of distress and the 
importance of the petroletim industry. Oil had been the only industry 
singled out for special federal legislation by the NIRA (Section 9). 
This was not without significance for the nation, the industry, and 
the code hearings of 1933. 9 
Men representing major and minor oil companies, as well as the 
states where oil dominated the economy, met in Washington on July 
24, 1933, for the first hearing on the code of fair practices and 
competition for the petroletnn industry. Immediately determined in-
terest groups drew battle lines which made open industrial civil war 
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inevitable. On the one side stood the highly organized and extremely 
powerful American Petroleum Institute. With major oil company man-
agement, this organization carried tremendous lobbying strength 
within the government, wrote the initial code proposal, and effectively 
controlled the public hearings. Across the battlefield, twenty-two 
independent petroletnn companies maintained a detetmined, but frus-
trating opposition to the code proposals of the A.P.I. Outmanned and 
outgunned by big oil and blocked by the Administration, these men 
could do little but voice their opposition to the code and lay the 
ground work for the key criticisms written into the Darrow Report of 
1935. 10 The labor unions involved in petroleum production sometimes 
sided with the latter group, but were not a reliable ally. Their 
natural interest beirtg working conditions, the union representatives 
tried to obtain for their workers the best bargain in terms of hours 
and wages. The reality of the industrial power structure forced the 
unions to bargain primarily with the A.P.I. and to limit their support 
of the independent oil men. Besides these industrial groups, each of 
the major petroletnn-producing states sent a representative to the 
hearings. Cautious, naturally political, tllese men maintained public 
neutrality on the inter-industrial disputes. However, they were in-
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sistent on some type of federal control which would save the oil 
industry while maintaining some degree of their state's rights. Also 
playing a much less significant role, though a voice nonetheless, was 
the consumer's representative who tried to give the American people 
some lobbying strength in this process. All these groups met under 
the direction of Hugh Johnson, Donald Richberg, and Deputy Administra-
tor Kenneth M. Simpson to present and discuss a reasonable and workable 
code for the industry. 
On Mon~ morning, July 24, after Johnson and Richberg had made 
some opening remarks, the American Petroleum Institute presented its 
proposed code. Axtel Byles, President of the A.P.I., and Oklahoman 
Wirt Franklin, President of the Independent Petroleum Association of 
America outlined the position of the A.P.I. and laid the foundation for 
all future discussion during the course of the hearings. The A.P.I. 
Code called for a balance of supply and demand by federal law. This 
was to be accomplished initially through the allocation of production 
in ratio to demand and production capacity. In addition, the federal 
government was to reduce excess oil storage and limit the importation 
of cheaper, foreign petroleum. A third step involved an increase irt 
the price of oil as well as a decrease in taxes on .the petroleum com-
panies. And after prices reached art agreeable level, the NRA was to 
stabilize t~em, with the federal government fixing a minimum. (Actu-
ally the A.P.I. was divided on this one issue, but Franklin's group, 
which dominated the hearings favored price fixing.) The hour and 
wage provisions of the proposed code included a maximum work week of 
forty hours (averaged over a six month period) with minimum wages 
varying from forty to forty-two cents per hour depending on the sec-
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tion of the country. Other provisions included federal support of the 
lease and licensing system for retailers and prohibition of inducements 
such as trading stamps. However agreeable this code was to some bil 
men, to others it was an anathema to be opposed at all costs. 11 
A group of 22 independent oil producers led the opposition to the 
A.P.I. 1 s code. The independents included such individuals and compan-
ies as Earl Oliver of Ponca City, H. v. Crawford, Vice-President of 
Hartal Products Corporation, Vernon c. Scott of Sperry and Hutchinson 
Co. and Newton Baker, President of the Pennsylvania Grade Crude Oil 
Association. These men and their organizations claimed that the entire 
code was unfair because the A.P.I. did not represent a majority of the 
Nation's oil companies. Instead they claimed that the code furthered 
big oil's monopoly of the industry and would drive the smaller companies 
out of business. More specifically the independents called for an end 
to th=!lease and licensing system which they claimed fostered monopoly. 
As an example, according to independent figures, Quaker State had lost 
20,000 outlets and about 11 million gallons since January 1, 1930 due 
to this system. The independents also did not want price-fixing, claim-
ing that big oil companies sold below cost to drive smaller companies 
out of the market resulting in low prices. Calling for the continued 
use of trading stamps, they believed that such stamps were important 
as a means of advertizing. The independents also opposed the use of 
any chemical to improve gas unless it was available to all companies. 
This latter item referred to tle use of the new tetra-ethyl fluid to 
improve octane developed by a subsidiary of Standard Oil of New Jersey. 
Independents also protested the proposed emergency oil committee which 
was to oversee the industry. They claimed that major oil companies 
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would dominate this group; .and, moreover, that the body would fail to 
represent marketing and retailing. Finally, the independents tried to 
win labor allies by a proposed maximum thirty hour week and minimum 
12 
wage of fifty cents.per hour. 
Union representatives, such as Harvey c. Fremming of the Oil 
Workers International Union, and P. B.,Roberts of the International 
Association of Oil Field, Gas Well and Refinery Workers of America, 
agreed with the independents on a thirty hour work week. However, they 
believed that forty to forty-two cents per hour rate would actually 
cause a decrease in wages in areas such as refining. Even fifty cents 
per hour was not enough. Instead, the affiliates of the American 
Federation of Labor wanted a minimum wage of $4.75 per six hour day 
(about seventy-nine cents_per hour), which was to be uniform nation-
wide. Also, to protect the wage and hour provisions of the code, the 
unions asked for a joint labor-business committee to enforce the code 
and a requirement that the oil companies post bond guaranteeing 
13 
wages. 
Advocates favoring the protection of the consumer, and the repre-
sentatives of the primary oil-producing states also addressed the 
public hearings concerning their problems. Thomas P. Henry, President 
of the American Automobile Association and consumer representative, 
made several proposals. He wanted a reduction in the number of re-
tail outlets, no exhorbitant increase in the prices of gas and oil, 
and no denial of the right to extend credit. The political represen-
tatives of the petroleum States were much less specific in their ad-
vice than any of the other interest groups. A good example was Paul 
Walker, representing Oklahoma's Governor and Corporation Commission 
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(that body within the state which watched over the petroleum industry). 
Walker remained carefully non-committal about supporting either the 
A.P.I.'s or the i.ndependents' proposals. However, he did plead for 
close cooperation between state authorities and the administration 
at both the advisory and enforcement levels. 14 
As a representative of the administration of Franklin Roosevelt, 
General Johnson fit his blustering, overbearing historical image. 15 
Never brilliant at winning friends and influencing people, the head 
of the NRA frequently interrupted speakers for what seemed to be no 
valid reason. Most often Johnson intervened to insist that speakers 
tone down their remarks. He persistently maintained that rhetoric and 
oratory had no place in a hearing which had been designed to reveal 
facts, allowing the administration to act intelligently. 16 The idea 
of a hearing without political maneuvering and speechmaking was a good 
one, if the rules applied evenly to all sides. Unfortunately, in the 
case of the meetings on the petroleum industry, the Administration 
demonstrated a decided slant in favor of big oil and in opposition to 
the independents and the unions. Most frequently, Johnson or Simpson 
interrupted an independent speaker to criticize either his method or 
his position. 17 For example, at one point early in the second day's 
hearing, the General harshly criticized the independents' repe~ted 
call for Federal intervention to stabilize the ailing industry. John-
son believed this was antithetical to the idea of industrial self~ 
government which supposedly lay at the heart of the NRA. Instead of 
supPorting and cooperating with this idea, the independen~s in~ist~d on 
a more extensive administration role, especially in th~ ar¢a of con-
18 trolling the already powerful and expansive big oil companies. 
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According to the Brookings Institution's study of the National 
Recovery Administration's codemaking process, the public hearings were 
only political platforms from which the Administration displayed the 
19 
success of industrial self-government. · The successful lobbying was 
done out of the public's sight; the Administration was more conserva-
tive and pro-business than its reformist rhetoric led the people to 
believe. The public hearing's minimal importance became very evident 
in the case of petroleum. Here the two sides, big oil and the inde-
pendents, could not reach a suitable compromise. Finally, General 
Johnson wrote his own code and imposed it upon the industry in. his 
. 20 
usual arbitrary manner. The transcripts of the hearings clearly 
demonstrated the direction in which the Administration was leaning and 
the shape that the final code would take. If the Administration sti-
fled the position of the independents where the latter could use the 
pressure of publicity and public opinion, then what would the NRA 1 s 
position be without that pressure? The answer is painfully clear. 
The power of big oil dominated the behind-the-scenes lobbying even 
more effectively than it had the public hearings. And although John-
son had imposed the code from the top, its provisions showed that big 
oil had won its battle for "self-government." Evidence of this vie-
tory can be found in several sources. One example was the general 
reception of the imposed code among the big oil companies. Despite 
the code's rather rude presentation, the major oil companies showed 
little resentment toward the Administration. In fact,. the day that_ 
the final code was presented to President Roosevelt, the principal 
executives of Standard Oil of Indiana, Standard Oil of New Jersey, 
Sun Oil Company, and Skelly Oil Company had a very friendly interview 
with Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes concerning the code and 
21 
regulation of the industry. However, nothing more clearly illus-
32 
trated that the govermnent favored the big oil companies than did the 
provisions of the final code for the industry. 
On August 19, 1933, Hugh Johnson communicated to President Roose-
velt the provisions of the code of fair competition for the petroleum 
industry. Throughout that document, from the general provi·sions to 
the more specific covering production, wages and hours, refining, 
marketing, and administration, ran the vein of influence leading 
back to a heart of big oil. The general provisions included in 
Article I defined the industry as covering the production, transport, 
refining, and marketing of crude oil, natural gas and their deriva-
tives. More important, however, was Section Five of this general 
article; this ruled.that any agreements between competitors designed 
to accomplish the objectives of this code or to eliminate the dup-
lication of manufacturing, transport, and marketing faci 1i ties were 
permitted. An open invitation to monopoly, Section Five directly 
aided the cause of the major oil companies and seriously impaired 
h f h . d d 22 t at o t e in epen ents. 
The sections on wages and hours in Article II showed some compro-
mise between the A.P.I. and labor, and completely ignored that of the 
independents. Marketing employees and clerical workers in production 
were to have forty hour weeks, and service station attendents could 
work forty-eight hours weekly. Other employees in production were on 
duty for not more than seventy-two hours in any fourteen consecutive 
days nor ··.more· than sixteen in any two days. Wages varied from one 
section of the country to another, according to the A.P.I.'s position; 
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and the scale was slightly higher than the A.P.I. wanted and much 
lower than the unions requested. Wages per hour for production em-
ployees ranged from forty-five cents, principally in the Southern 
states, to fifty-two cents, on the East and West coasts. Those for 
marketing were slightly less, forty cents to forty-seven cents. (Ok-
lahoma ranked at forty-eight cents per hour for production and forty 
cents per hour for marketing.) Sections banning employment of child-
ren under 16 years of age, and rules permitting collective bargaining 
also were includedin this Article. 23 
Article III, dealing with production, followed the general out-
line the A.P.I. presented with the exception of price-fixing. The 
goverrnnent limited imports of crude oil and ordered that the with-
drawal of crude petroleum from storage not exceed 100,000 barrels per 
day for the remainder of 1933. Production was to be equitably allo-
cated or pro-rated among the states according to estimated demand; 
the latter followed big oil's initial suggestion. Although there was 
no general price-fixing for crude oil, Section 6A of this article 
granted the President the power to fix the price of gasoline for an 
experimental period of ninety days. The last section probably did 
the most damage to the independents, for it prohibited wildcatting, 
previously a gold mine for these groups. 24 
The article on marketing hit the independents hard in two areas. 
Retail stations were not allowed any type of incentives such as re-
bates, concessions, script books, games (lotteries, prizes, etc.), 
and especially trading stamps. This removed possible advertising 
gimmicks with which the independents could challenge big oil's lower 
prices. Second, no company could break a contract to sell petroleum 
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products. Here independents suffered by not being able to sell their 
goods (such as Quaker State or Penn State Motor Oil) to retail agen-
cies owned or licensed by the major companies. Neutral sections of 
this article included a required posting of prices for oil products, 
an industry-wide, uniform basis of credit, and a ban against false 
d . . 25 a vertising. 
The final article of the petroleum code dealt with the adminis-
tration of industrial self-government for petroleum. A Planning 
and Coordinating Committee of fifteen members,three men from the NRA 
and twelve from the oil companies, policed the industry. Eight 
technical subcommittees covering the areas of statistics, production., 
refining, marketing, accounting, labor, adjustment, and transporta-
. ~d d th" 26 tion ai e is group. The final evidence supporting the thesis 
that big oil controlled the development of the codes, as well as 
their administration, can be found in this committee's composition. 
Of the three administnators from the NRA, one, J. A. Moffett, former 
Vice-President of Standard Oil of New Jersey, definitely favored big 
oil. The other two, Donald Richberg and M. L. Benedum may have been 
less biased. In contrast, the major oil companies completely con-
trolled the fifteen industrial members. Nine men on the committee 
represented the position of b~g oil, with only two favoring the in-
27 dependents and one w~o might vote either way. 
Unquestionably, on the national level a majority of conservative 
businessmen or their sympathizers staffed the National Recovery Ad-
ministration. The codemaking process in the case study form of the 
petroleum industry illustrated this fact perfectly. Clearly big oil 
companies claimed a nearly complete victory over their independent 
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opposition; and moreover, big oil formed an alliance with the federal 
government which has endured to the present. Will Rogers had pre-
dicted this outcome at the beginning of the code hearings for oil: 
"Frank Phillips, of oil fame, was out the other day, said he was 
going to Wash:j.,ngton, the oi,l men were going to draw up a code of 
ethics. Everybody present laughed. If he had said the gangsters of 
America were drawing up a code of ethics it wouldn't have sounded 
near as impossible.1128 
If the business influence and control of the NRA was so pervasive 
nationally, it doubtless extended to state agencies. Thus it is only 
natural that in Oklahoma one could expect similar influence. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EAGLE ' S BROOD 
Even while the code hearings progressed in Washington, the 
National Recovery Administration spread its feathered shadow across 
the land, gathering states and cities under its protective wing. 
This process included a propaganda drive to stir support for the 
Blue Eagle, a push for each state to pass a "little NRA" designed 
to cover intrastate companies, and the development of state and local 
agencies for recovery. In theory, at least, each state NRA organi-
zation had jurisdiction over its own recovery committee, the enforce-
ment of the codes for its industries, and its. campaign to push the 
Blue Eagle. Frequently, as was the case in Oklaho~a, one agency, one 
group of individuals executed all of these functions, establishing 
publicity, persuading businesses to join, and later, enforcing the 
codes. In most states the NRA chose those individuals from either 
the state and local Chambers of Commerce or trade associations close-
ly affiliated with those bodies. This choice was important in that 
the administration made no radical attempt to alter the local power 
structure, other than showing partial favor to Democrats over Re-
publicans. Established, conservative, usually business-oriented 
groups operated the state and local NRAs just as they controlled the 
national administration and its codemaking machinery. 
The establishment of Oklahoma's NRA, the passage of a state re-
covery law, and the campaign to promote the Blue Eagle ran into spe-
cial, political barriers frOm its inception during the Summer of 1933. 
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These problems focused upon a running conflict between the national 
administration and the state government of Governor William H. Murray. 
"Alfalfa Bill" had organized a favorite-son campaign for the Democra-
tic presidential nomination in 1932. Under the slogan, "Bread, Butter, 
Bacon, and Beans," Murray carried out a totally unsuccessful bid for 
the nation's highest office. His attacks on Roosevelt grew increas-
ingly bitter as the campaign wore on, and his hatred for the new 
Democratic President increased with each passing month until it "domi-
nated his thinking on nearly every issue. 111 This ill-feeling mani-
fested itself in concentrated opposition to the New Deal from Okla:-
homa1 s state house. Naturally, the NRA, as the principal New Deal 
weapon against depression, drew a variety of antagonistic criticism 
from Governor Murray. The governor's attitude was reflected in the 
operation of Oklahoma's recovery administration. An example of Mur-
ray's attitude occurred in August of 1933; Ancel Earp, head of 
Oklahoma City's drive to promote the Blue Eagle, requested that the 
state's Chief Executive head a parade advertising reemployment and 
the NRA. Displaying his feelings toward the New Deal 1 s agency with 
obvious malintent, Murray refused to attend, conveniently excusing 
himself with a more pressing engagement. 2 The governor attacked the 
New Deal and the NRA more directly by not calling a meeting of the 
state recovery board. This body was supposed to give guidance to the 
local recovery agencies, direct the state-wide Blue Eagle drive, 
disseminate information from the national administration, and provide 
general assistance. After a request from local officials, the federal 
administration pressured Murray into calling the board. 3 However, 
because of this political roadblocking, many of the duties and 
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responsibilities of the state board fell onto the shoulders of the 
NRA group in Oklahoma City. 
Not all state politicians and officials supported Governor Murray's 
animosity toward the New Deal. Campaigning on the slogan "Bring the 
New Deal to Oklahoma," Congressman Ernest w. Marland defeated Tom 
Anglin, speaker of the state's House of Representatives and Murray's 
chosen successor, in the gubernatorial primary of 1934. Later elected 
governor, Marland proved more sympathetic and cooperative toward the 
4 New Deal and the NRA. J. Berry King, Attorney-General under Murray, 
was also more friendly toward the Demoractic program. When confronted 
with the possibility that the NRA might conflict with an Oklahoma law 
of 1931 governing trusts, King used the wide interpretive powers of 
his office to rule in favor of the Blue Eagle. This removed a 
possible technical hassle which could have caused considerable prob-
lems for those men in Oklahoma City, and elsewhere across the state, 
who were trying to create a state organization, popularize their 
efforts, and persuade businessmen to join the President's fight against 
depression and unemployment. 5 
The National Recovery Administration hoped to convince each state 
to pass "little NRAs" covering industries involved in intrastate com-
merce. (The NIRA only governed companies with interstate trade.) 
However, in most states the passage of such laws proved very difficult. 
For various reasons, including politics, legislative calenders, and 
hostility to the federal bureaucracy, this type of legislation passed 
in only four states (Washington, Indiana, New Mexico, and Wyoming), 
though it reached the floor of some twenty other state legislatures. 6 
Most states either pidgeonholed the bill when it came before them or 
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managed to avoid the subject altogether. Probably as a result of 
Governor Murray's political influence in or control of the legislature, 
Oklahoma never discussed a "little NRA" in 1933-34. 7 By the time the 
more sympathetic Marland had come to power in 1934, the NRA 1 s interde-
partmental problems and dubious constitutional status made the passage 
of such a bill almost impossible. 
Despite intense opposition from the Governor's office and legisla-
tive roadblocks to a state recovery law, Oklahoma still managed to 
create a State Recovery Board and a very important local organization 
in Oklahoma City. The State Recovery Board with the assistance of 
the State Recovery Council directed the NRA at Oklahoma's level. 
Frank Buttram, President of Buttram Petroleum Company, Chairman of 
the Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, and former 
Democratic candidate for governor headed the board. The State board 
acted as a transmission agent, receiving reports of the county chair-
men, synthesizing them, and relaying that information to Washington. 
However, in cases where the federal administration deemed it necessary, 
the board acted on the NRA's behalf, enforcing federal laws. Acting 
as an advisor on local conditions, but with no technical power, the 
State Recovery Council included representatives from six districts of 
the state and members of state-wide businesses and trade associations. 
Besides advising the State Board, the Council also assisted county and 
local groups with any technical problems involving the Blue Eagle or 
the NRA 1 s rules and regulations. 8 
Oklahoma City's NRA Committee was possibly even more significant 
than the State Board, because of political and economic circumstances. 
Organized to complete the Blue Eagle drive for the state capital, the 
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Committee later expanded its influence over the entire state apparatus. 
Oklahoma City maintained control through the city's Chamber of Commerce 
which dominated the Committee and financed all state, county, and local 
NRA groups. Oklahoma City's organization had dual command at the top 
with Ancel Earp and Mrs. J. J. Volz acting as co-directors. These two 
individuals represented the conservative, business-oriented, upper 
class people who rart the NRA at the state and local levels. Ancel 
Earp operated his own insurance company, had formerly served as sec-
retary to Governor Robert Williams, had held office as the state's 
Adjutant-General, had been in charge of Oklahoma's draft boards in 
World War I, and had been President of the Better Business Bureau. 
Mrs. Volz had acted as head of the largest women's club in the state. 
Two major groups served immediately under the co-directors in the 
state administration. The seventeen-member E.xecutive Council aided 
with top-level decision-making and the Advisory Council, comprised of 
leaders in trade, business, and professional groups, kept the leader-
ship informed of the attitudes of its members toward the NRA's rulings 
d . 9 an actions. 
The Committee had a two-fold purpose: the group administered the 
local recovery agency, which required several sub-groups, and enforced 
the NRA 1 s rules. The leadets of the Committee interpreted the latter 
function very conservatively. Only when the local trade association 
or professional group was unable to enforce a code would the Committee 
intervene to see that a business obeyed the federal law. The creation 
of an administrative organization was more energetic and successful, 
with the bureaucracy taking on a life of its own. The central organi-
zation established six sub-committees, decentralizing control, deci-
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sion-making, and responsibility. These included groups covering the 
areas of adjustment, interpretation, exceptions, compliance, publicity, 
and education. The first of these sub-organizations ,on adjustment, 
which Tom H. Sterling headed, served as a liason group between business 
and the main committee. Containing seven members, adjustment provided 
help and advice on the NRA's rule and codes. This group helped all 
industries and businesses meet the requirements of the President's 
program with as little friction as possible. 
The interpretations sub-committee, chaired by L. Dudley Callahan, 
acted as an advisory body both to the local NRA groups and the city's 
businesses. These seven men had been trained in the federal laws and 
codes and dealt with any problems or complaints stemming from federal 
rulings and interpretations. This body had one of the most difficult 
jobs in the recovery program because it acted as the bearer of bad 
news. Rulings out of the nation's capital constantly fluctuated, 
seeming to change with the season, and intepretations had the responsi-
bility of delivering the news and explaining these variations. 
The sub-committee on exceptions was the only secret organization 
within the local NRA. The recovery group designed exceptions to rule 
on what businesses would be exempt from the NRA's regulations. Theo-
retically, this committee granted exemptions only in the rare cases 
where compliance created extreme hardships for a business. However, 
either the committee kept no records of their rulings or they destroyed 
them at some later date; thus it is very difficult to determine how 
often the committee granted exemptions. (Technically the compliance 
group had the power to make this decision. But the secret organization 




The seven-man compliance board determined violations of the N!RA 
and the codes, as well as nominally passing exceptions to those rules. 
By a majority vote, the committee decided who had broken the law, 
passing their ruling to the district recovery board in Dallas, and 
then to Washington. This group also attempted mediation over union 
contracts and labor disputes or passed these problems on to the Nat-
ional Labor Board. Two weaknesses relating to compliance proved very 
significant in the final failure of the NRA. Labor had only two 
representatives on the board, creating a definite advantage in favor 
of management. Decisions tended to support the latter, explaining to 
some extent why the NRA did little to help the American union movement 
except to legitimatize its existence and give it a psychological up-_ 
lift. Moreover, the fact that the local. board had little or no power 
to enforce its decisions seriously impaired the effectiveness of the 
NRA. Time, distance, and the bureaucratic hierarchy benefited viola-
tors and frustrated those who sought a just hearing under the Blue 
11 Eagle. 
The last two sub-committees, publicity and education, -created the 
all-important, patriotic image of the NRA, its supporters and its 
enemies. The publicity group, which H. P. Hoheisel of the Oklahoma 
City Advertising Club headed, had been subdivided into five parts, each 
blanketing a different aspect of publicizing the NRA and its campaign. 
These included the Newspaper Bureau, the Radio Bureau, the Poster Bur-
eau, the Amusement Bureau, and a group handling trade journals, civic 
clubs, bulletins, and other miscellaneous areas. The education commit-
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tee, comprised of the Appointment Bureau, the Information Bureau, and 
the Speaker's Bureau was even more important. The last of these was 
an important factor in the Blue Eagle's propaganda drive. Theodore 
M. Green of the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company headed 
the Speaker's Bureau as it launched a barrage of supporting fire from 
169 of the corrnnunities top business, professional, and religious 
12 leaders. These men stressed the patriotic nature of the recovery 
venture and emphasized the fact that the government was not trying to 
take over business; instead, the NRA wanted to help make those few who 
gave business a bad name compete fairly. The local committee ordered 
the speakers to discuss subjects that fit the "spirit of the movement" 
and to deal in "technicalities as little as possible." A religious 
appeal added strongly to the support for the NRA. The city's pastors 
preached sermons countering charges that the Blud Eagle was the "Mark 
of the Beast" from the Biblical book of Revelation, and many pledged 
their support to the government in its war on depression. 13 
The various groups responsible for guiding the American people 
under the wing of the big bird from Washington functioned with few 
direct interferences from the federal level. Yet the officials of the 
National Recovery Administration saw the need for creating some type 
of uniformity over the bureaucratic sprawl. The Administration de-
signed a series of pamphlets and bulletings providing guidelines for 
the recovery opeation at the state and local levels. These included 
manuals on the various codes, and bulletj_ns explaining the basic code 
of fair competition, interpretations of the new laws, and the Presi-
dent's Reemployment Agreement. Many of the committees also had instruc-
tion manuals on their operations, providing a definition of their 
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14 function, and an explanation of their powers. How effective these 
were in providing guidance from the top remains questionable. Most 
. 15 
states wanted as little help as possible from the federal government. 
In Oklahoma there was no indication in the available records that the 
local leadership relied very heavily on these pamphl~ts, with the 
possible exception of those dealing with propaganda. Local leaders 
tried to fit the local recovery program to local needs and to the local 
power structure, without too much unbalancing influence from Washington. 
The efforts of the propaganda section clearly illustrated the 
extent of the federal agency's concern over state and local programs. 
A study of the pamphlets governing publicity indicated a strong emphasis 
on an intensely war-like patriotism. Phrases such as "battle cry," 
"firing line, 11 "national declaration of war on depression" called the 
nation to battle. The pamphlets tied the Administration and the NRA 
closely to the greatness of America: "regard the Blue Eagle as 
reverently and as faithfully as ••• the American flai~" and remember it 
has always been "a symbol of American courage, American standards, 
and American spirit. 11 One NRA speaker described President Roosevelt 
as "one of the greatest champions of the masses of men that has ever 
walked this earth," and compared him to all the great heroes of American 
political history (all Democrats, naturally): "Once it was Thomas 
Jefferson. Once it was Andrew Jackson. Once it was Abraham Lincoln, 
who, regardless of party label, was a Democrat. Once it was Grover 
Cleveland. Once it was Woodrow Wilson--and now it is Franklin Roose-
velt. 11 And the enemy was the "chiseling fringe," the "seditious gos-
sips," "the sabotagers," the "resisters to progress," "the slackers," 
all out to destroy the New Deal and all hope of recovery. Everyone 
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must fall into line and no one criticize: "'Bend to the oars brothers! 
Pull for the shore. 16 Don't rock the boat! 111 Besides specific 
references for the use of local speakers, the federal agency also pro-
vided a manual for small-group study and discussion of the NRA. This 
included an interpretation of the recovery program and an explanation 
of how it worked, along with an outline for adult study groups and 
suggestions for community forums on the Blue Eagle.- Oklahoma City's 
committee held weekly .meetings such as the latter at the Chamber of 
C "th b h i d t 1 d · · d to attend. 17 ommerce, wi ot c ty an · ou -state ea ers invite 
The.NRA advertised its patriotic pitch extensively through the 
newspapers. The agency managed the news in several ways, both direct• 
ly, by buying ads itself, and more indirectly, through a subtle mani-
pulation of the press. First, the local committees bought full page 
ads supporting the Blue Eagle or ran daily lists of those who had 
pledged their cooperation with the NRA. Second, the flood of news 
from Washington kept the recovery program in the limelight. Each day 
NRA-related stories dominated the news, grabbing the biggest headlines 
and the most print. Business did their part too by including the Blue 
Eagle insignia on their advertisements. They proclaimed their support 
for the NRA in print, which not only helped sell products, but also 
helped sell Roosevelt's program~ 18 
The problem with this almost religious approach to solving the 
problems of economic recovery lay in its psychological effect on the 
individual. The very fact that patriotism equalled complete support 
for the President and his program stifled creativity and constructive 
criticism: "Everybody in this crisis should trust this government ••• 
Wars can only be won by unlimited faith in leaders ••• Upon you devolve 
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the duty of giving your moral support at all times ••• to the government 
which is seekirig to bring about the harmony of the laws of God and the 
laws of man ••• In this way you can cooperate with them in bringing 
about the Kingdom of God on Earth. 1119 This type of propaganda is 
always the problem with bureaucracies and governments based on a parti-
san political system; but it becomes even more intense when the 
government labeled the opposition as unAmerican "leaders of greed and 
standpatism'' and called supporters workers for the Kingdom of God. 
Besides the working staff, the New Kingdom of the Blue Eagle re-
quired an extensive volunteer or~anization to bring everyone under the 
watchful eye of the NRA. In Oklahoma City, and elsewhere across the 
nation, the Volunteer National Recovery Sales Army filled this hole 
in the administrative foundation. This group was divided into two 
sub-divisions, the Blue Eagle Army and the Loyalty Army. The first, 
led by Colonel Lyall Barnhart, explained to businessmen all the 
provisions of the NRA, persuaded them to join by signing the President's 
Reemployment Agreement, and gathered information on the effects of 
the program on the local economy. The Blue Eagle Army numbered four 
divisions with 1155 volunteers working to recruit business. The 
second group secured pledges supporting the President's Consumer Agree-
ments, committing individual citizens to patronize only those stores 
bearing the insignia of the Blue Eagle. The NRA had split the Loyalty 
Army into two divisions, one for men and one for women, comprising a 
total of nine regiments and 494 workers. The special status awarded 
to women throughout the NRA 1 s campaign and organization stressed their 
importance as buyers and consumers. But that status remained within 
the traditional guidelines of woman as wife and mother. The NRA did 
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place great emphasis on women in their campaign with five regiments 
under the Women's Division. This group aroused local housewives to 
the importance of the Blue Eagle. The Women 1 s Division contacted all 
women's organizations in the city, frequently kept news about the re-
covery program on the woman's page of the newspaper, geared ads to wo-
men and their concerns, contacted women's church groups, and obtained 
radio time for women speaking in favor of the Blue Eagle. The recovery 
organization also singled out Blacks for special attention by creating 
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a specific regiment, the fifth, especially for "colored" people. 
In all of the local organizations the Chamber of Connnerce played a 
f« 
vital role, providing manpower and leadership. Oklahoma City's Recovery 
Connnittee drew almost all of its officers from the ranks of the Chamber. 
The business organization provided men and money as well as physical 
facilities for meetings, study groups, and rallies. The Chamber tied 
its own organization closely to that of the NRA in other ways as well. 
For example, it gave local businessmen the full support and cooperation 
of the Chamber's industrial connnittee to work out any NRA related 
problems. At least in Oklahoma City, the Chamber of Connnerce and the 
state and local recovery groups were more closely associated than indi-
cated by some historians' recent research. 21 
Despite the massive administrative organization (over 2000 workers 
in Oklahoma City along), the directions from Washington, and the jockey-
ing for political power, the NRA still had to convince business and the 
public that support of the government's program meant economic recovery. 
This began with the Blue Eagle Drive of August, 1933, designed to raise 
wages, create employment, increase purchasing power, and restore busi-
ness by persuading business and consumers to sign the President's 
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Reemployment and Consumer Agreements. The NRA hit the air waves with 
a month-long series of promotional radio broadcasts including such 
speakers as Alfred E. Smith, Robert M. LaFollette, John D. Rockefeller, 
Jr., William Green, Admiral Richard E. Byrd, and Fannie Hurst. At the 
local level, an intensive speaking campaign commenced, blanketing 
every public meeting in each community. The committee also held 
rallies and parades to sell the Blue Eagle to every city, town, and 
hamlet. The Volunteer National Recovery Sales Army also conducted a 
house-to-house, business-to-business canvass. The actual campaign 
began on August 27 with a nationwide radio broadcast including General 
Hugh Johnson, Madame Ernestine Schumann-Heink, and Will Rogers as the 
principal speakers, and starring such entertainers as Bing Crosby, 
Eddie Cantor, Burns & Allen, Kate Smith, and Al Jolson. 22 Off to a 
beginning that paralleled the opening of a Hollywood epic production, 
the organization next had to do the real work of obtaining signatures 
and pledges to the Blue Eagle. 
The first and apparently, most important task (as indicated by 
the fact that over twice as many workers were allotted to this job as 
to obtaining consumer pledges) of the drive was to obtain signatures 
from business and professional men on the President's Reemployment 
Agreement. The PRA, approved under Title I, Section 4A of the NIRA, 
served the two-fold purpose of attacking unemployment and generating 
interest in, and support for, the National Recovery Administration. 
The agreement, to cover from August 1 until either December 31 or the 
date of an approved code, brought industry and business under the pro-
visions of the recovery act. It ended the employment of children under 
16 years of age; it limited work hours for "accounting, clerical, 
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banking, office, service or sales employees" to 40 hours in any one 
week and kept office or business hours at a minimum of 52 hours per 
week; it restricted industrial laborers to a maximum of 35 hours per 
week; it set minimum wages at from 12 dollars per week to 15 dollars 
per week, depending on the size of the community or not less than 40 
cents per hour; it required that companies not reduce wages in excess 
of minimum and not raise prices "more than made necessary by actual 
increases in production, replacement, or invoice costs of merchandise, 
or by taxes or other costs ••• 11 resulting frem compliance with the Ag-
ricultural Adjustment Act; it demanded support and patronization of 
other establishments displaying the Blue Eagle and cooperation in the 
creation of a code for that particular industry. The PRA also made 
provision for appeals concerning any articles of the PRA due to any 
hardship caused by any section of the Agreement. 23 
The second task of the Sales Army was much less complex in the 
terms of the agreement, if much more extensive in the territory to be 
covered. This was obtaining the signatures of the city's residents to 
the Consumer's Agreement, pledging support of only those companies who 
had signed the PRA and displayed the Blue Eagle. The Loyalty Army 
accomplished this goal be dividing the city into zones with a regiment 
assigned to each. The volunteers then sold the NRA door-to-door like 
recovery-encyclopedia vendors. 
In addition to the workings of the Volunteer National Recovery Sales 
Army, radio programs, and local speakers, the NRA promoted its Blue 
Eagle Drive through several other means. The recovery committee held 
a five mile long parade of the unemployed and built a twenty foot by 
200 foot billboard containing the names of those who had signed the 
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Blue Eagle pledges. Probably the biggest promotional event was a mass 
rally held in Oklahoma City on September 6. Washington included the 
entire Southwestern Di strict in the meeting which listed as its main 
guests Representative Henry Rainey, Speaker of the House, and resident 
of Okmulgee Mrs. s. L. Johnson, mother of the NRA 1 s national director. 
Oklahoma 1 s initial response to the Blue Eagle Drive overwhelmingly 
favored the new program. By August 31, over two-thirds of the city's 
businesses had signed the PRA, and consumer pledges totaled 101,693. 
The latter included 36,870 white males, 62,778 white females, and 
a total of 2,045 Blacks. By as early as August 6, 1800 new workers 
had been added to the city 1 s businesses, amounting to a payroll increase 
of 15,000 dollars per week. For example, the city 1 s grocery stores 
added 500 employees by going on a 40 hour work week and six hour work 
day; M1Ewen-Halliburton Dry Goods Store increased its payro 11 by 30 
workers; and Rorabaugh-Brown Dry Goods Company added 20 employees. In 
fact, there are indications that Oklahoma City led the nation in the 
drive for pledges. Praising the efforts of the city, and its director, 
Ancel Earp, a memo from Washington to all state committees cited the 
Sooner state's NRA progress as the best exmaple of the national cam-
paign. Oklahoma 1 s efforts in the Blue Eagle Drive even merited a visit 
from Harry Hopkins, head of the Civil Works Administration and princi-
pal advisor to President Roosevelt; Hopkins met with campaign workers 
and the city 1 s Chamber of Commerce on August 23. 25 
Oklahoma 1 s oil interests formed the principal industry in the state, 
and this group actively participated. Oklahoma was the first among the 
oil-producing states to accept the petroleum code provisions and come 
under the Blue Eagle. Many of the big oil companies (including 
Continental Oil, Magnolia Petroleum, Gypsy Oil, Marathon Oil, Mid-
Kansas Oil & Gas, Phillips Petroleum) were among the earliest to sign 
the PRA, reemploying 2,200 workers and increasing the state's buying 
26 power by 5,500 dollars per day. 
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Citizens of the Sooner state expressed their stlpport in many other 
ways besides simply signing their pledges. State newspapers stated 
their views in the form of editorials and editorial cartoons calling 
for full cooperation with the President and the recovery program. The 
University of Oklahoma announced that it planned an addition of forty 
new courses to be held during the evenings and oil. Saturdays. These 
were to help workers use the excess leisure time made available by 
shorter working hours. Men who were reemployed under the Blue Eagle 
from Guymon, Oklahoma started the nation 1 s first NRA baseball team. 
According to the team's captain, C. L. Saunders, baseball helped keep 
"thoughts of hard times and blue days away from the human mind." The 
team carried a banner displaying the Blue Eagle to all ballgames, para-
d . • h • d h I • 27 ing wit it own t e town s main street. 
In addition to the more traditional business, professional and 
citizen's groups who promised to work for the Blue Eagle, Oklahoma's 
more radical elements also offered their suggestions and support. The 
Progressive Youth of Oklahoma, an organization of young Socialists, 
Communists, and Liberals backed the NRA, but promised to keep it honest 
by lobbying for strict enforcement of the codes. Leftist help also 
came from Oklahoma's United Front which included the Veterans of Indus-
try, Farmers and Workers of America, the International Labor Defense, 
and the Socialist and Communist parties. This group offered several 
names for labor representatives on the compliance board, none of whom 
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were accepted. The stand of Oklahoma's Left ran counter to that of its 
national brothers. For.example, the National Executive Committee of 
the. Socialist Party, in a statement issued July 4, 1933, denounced the 
NRA as only dealing with the symptoms of a far more pervasive disease. 
The Socialists also feared that this arrangement easily could have been 
d ' A i f F ' 28 turne into an mer can type o ascism. 
Every aspect of the National Recovery Administration at the state 
leve 1, as illustrated by Oklahoma, leaned very heavily toward the 
conservative side of the socio-economic and political scale. The 
' 
state and local organization remained in the hands of upper and upper-
middle class, business-oriented groups such as the trade associations 
and the Chamber of Commerce. The membership and the methods of the 
varied sub-committees reflected this conservatism. For example, the 
Compliance Committee had only two union members, making it very diffi-
cult for workers to battle successfully against management interest. 
The secrecy of the exceptions group also made it easier to hand down 
potentially unpopular rulings. Moreover, the propaganda section's 
patriotic appeal effectively silenced early dissent by labeling it 
un-American. Even the NRA's recognition of Blacks and women did so 
only within the framework of their "place" in society. And this con-
servative, traditional approach created tremendous popular support 
for the Blue Eagle. At first, groups from all sides of the political 
spectrum (even the Left in Oklahoma) offered their help to the Presi-
dent in getting his program started. Yet, very quickly the honeymoon 
was over and the NRA came under increasingly heavy fire for its 
actions and its failure to act~ 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE EAGLE'S NEST 
During the period from August 1933 to May 1935, the Blue Eagle 
flew through increasingly stormy weather. Struck by the lightening 
of its potential opponents and buffeted by the winds of its own bureau-
cratic malaise, the old bird which had started with such a patriotic 
and powerful climb, barely fluttered by the time the United States 
Supreme Court gunned it down in 1935. Although it failed in its orig-
inal goal of stimulating the economy and ending unemployment, the NRA 
left a significant impact on all aspects of the politicaland economic 
scene. The recovery agency definitely affected the nation, causing 
tangible fluctuations of wages and prices and, even more, the organi-
zation influenced the psychology of almost all sections of society. 
Examining the public statements of opponents and proponents among 
business, labor, civic and political leaders clearly illustrated this 
influence. Certain long-range reactions and results developed across 
the nation along distinct lines, with Oklahoma paralleling this trend 
in some ways but traveling at right angles in others. By examining 
these elements, the historian can determine both the response of many 
segments of the population to the Blue Eagle and the ultimate economic 
success or failure of the experiment. 
In trying to analyze the effect of the NRA on the American ecnomic 
system, the researcher ~ust be careful not to approach his subject 
from a monocausal point of view. It is unreasonable to assume that the 
federal program alone caused all the fluctuations in the economy from 
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1933 to 1935; the sys~em was much too complex for this. However, the 
National Recovery Administration had been designed specifically to 
help business recover from its crippled state, to establish a minimum 
wage and thereby increase wages and purchasing power, and to create a 
state on which labor unions could function on a legally sanctioned 
basis, 'increasing their power in dealing with management. And, init-
ially at least, the Blue Eagle met with widespread accept,ance from 
business, labor, and consumers. Therefore, it seems safe to assume 
that the NRA played a significant role in changes that occurred in 
corporate profits and production levels, prices, employment, wages, 
and labor's economic position. 
The research for this thesis has shown that conservative, business 
interests controlled the recovery program at the federal, state, and 
local levels. If this were true, then logically business must have 
received major benefits frOm the program, at the expense of other 
sections of the economy. An examination of figures from 1933 to 
1935 has indicated this to be the case. Corporate profits for 290 of 
America's top industries in 1932 totaled only $100,000; by 1934 this 
level had increased to over $430 million. For example, automobile 
manufacturers who had suffered a deficit of nearly nineteen million 
dollars saw their profits rise to more than eighty-six million dollars; 
steel industries that had a deficit of over $103 million cut their 
deficit to $7.5 million, and chemicals and drugs, fr0m nearly forty-two 
million dollars in profits to over seventy-eight million dollars. 
Significantly for Oklahoma, the oil industry had increased its profits 
from more than twenty million dollars in 1932 to nearly forty-two 
1 
million dollars two years later. While this did not approach the 
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mountainous highs in 1929, it represented an increase of over 4000 per 
cent in two years. Industrial production also demonstrated a climb dur-
ing the early months of the New Deal. With production indexed at 100 
for 1899, industry dipped from 308 in 1929 to 163 in 1932, but by 1934, 
this figure had increased to 205. 2 Another more negative indicator, 
business insolvency, also painted a favorable picture of industry. 
From a high of 900 failures in January 1932, the insolvency trend 
reached a low of 170 in September 1934.3 All three of these indicated 
that business had done much better under the Blue Eagle than it had 
done from 1929 to 1932. 
While industrial recovery, the first objective of the NIRA, sue-
ceeded, the second, alleviation of unemployment, failep miserably. 
In March 1933, the low point in the depression valley, more than 
thirteen million American workers sought some means of employment. 
With 1929 equalling 100, this indexed at an unhealthy fifty-six. 
By November 1934, after more than a year of reemployment under the Blue 
Eagle, the United States still had over eleven million in the ranks of 
the unemployed, an index score of seventy-three. Although unemploy-
ment had declined seventeen points, for such an extensive venture as 
the NRA sti 11 to remain twenty- seven points off the leve 1 of 192 9 ex-
pressed the remarkable degree of its failure. If Oklahoma faired 
better than other states it was due to the condition of employment in 
the petroleum industry. From March 1933 to November 1934, unemployment 
in oil declined thirty-six points, more than twice the national aver-
4 
age. But even in the Sooner state, the patient still was listed on 
the critical list. Wages had made some increase under the auspices of 
the NRA, but hardly enough to have a significant effect on the sick 
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economy. Per capita weekly income reached a low of $16.32 in April, 
1933. Watched by the Blue Eagle, this climbed to a high of $19.96 in 
April, 1934, ari increase of $3.64 or twenty-two per cent. Unfortunately 
for the workingman, during the same time period, the cost of living 
index had risen eight points or twelve per cent, cutting that wage in-
crease in half. Wages in the petrolelllll. industry actually declined 
twenty-eight cents during this period. But even in April, 1934, its 
weekly average of $27 .13 was well above the national level. 5 Even with 
these minor increases i.n wages, the national incomes, adjusted for 
cost of living, declined from nearly six billion dollars in early 1934 
to almost five and half billion dollars later in that year. Though 
this measured slightly more than the low of early 1933, it still re-
mained well below the nearly seven billion dollars of 1929. 6 A marked 
increase in purchasing power was essential to riaticlnal recovery in the 
Great Depression. Without it industry had no incentive to increase 
production, add more employees to the payroll and, put more money into 
the economic cycle in the form of payrolls~ Company profits may have 
demonstrated a sharp rise under the Blue Eagle but wages did not, and 
without that the National Recovery Administration and the New Deal 
largely failed in their primary objective. The economic downturn 
would be dealt its death blow only with the coming of the war ye::rs in 
1939, and the corresponding high level of industrial output, employ-
ment, and wages. 
In addition to the creation of a minimum wage, another expressed 
purpose of the recovery program, was establishing maximum hours in the 
coded industries. The creators of the NRA had designed this provision 
to end the tremendously long working hours in some businesses, and also 
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to force employers to hire more workers to fill in the lost man-hours. 
The hours worked per week averaged forty-nine in April, 1929 and had 
declined to thirty-six by the same month in 1934. 7 At least this 
indicated that those who had jobs might have had an easier time in the 
factory. But this had little impact on the total economy. The pre-
vious pages have shown that there had been little increase in wages or 
decrease in unemployment. If this were true, then the ultimate effect 
of the shorter hours could not have been good. Less hours and fewer 
workers led to a smaller national payroll. Thus, the American 
worker's ability to purchase consumer goods had been weakened con-
siderably by the Blue Eagle, hindering recovery rather than helping it. 
Besides wages and hours, the National Recovery Administration 
weakened prices, yet another area of the economic structure. The only 
saving grace to a normal depression is the fact that prices remain 
depressed along with lower wages and higher unemployment. The NRA 
definitely had a detrimental effect on the purchasing power of Ameri-
can workers and consumers, as well as adversely affecting prices. 
Prices for all manufactured commodities, based on a. 1926 level of 100, 
bottomed at fifty-nine in early 1933. However, under the direction 
of the federal recovery program, costs rose to seventy-eight, an 
increase in nineteen points. From 1929 to 1933 wholesale prices had 
jumped eighteen per cent, retail food, clothing, and housefurnishing 
prices had climbed twelve per cent. These increases must have de-
lighted industrialists whose profits were on the upswing. But wor-
kers and constnners suffered through the high prices. Real per-capita 
earnings for manufacturing employers had leveled off five per cent 
higher by 1934, but that hardly compared to the rate at which prices 
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had climbed during the same period. Increasing prices as result of 
the Blue Eagle also were reported in Oklahoma. These included an in-
crease in the cost of meals five to twenty cents and in the price of 
8 
a haircut to fifty cents. Increasing costs further hurt the nation 
by decreasing the consumer's ability to buy the products, which form 
the basis of a modern economy. The NRA influenced rising prices 
through its indirect general effects on the economic structure, but 
it also had a more direct impact. In many industries the Administration 
instituted minimum price levels to shore-up seriously dislocated busi-
nesses. Though of limited success, where it did work, this procedure 
kept prices at levels which only could have been maintained by artifi-
cial means, allowing industry to resist consumer pressure aimed at 
1 . h . 9 owering t ose prices. 
From today's perspective the Blue Eagle obviously failed in almost 
every area but one. Millions remained unemployed, wages increased at 
only a minimal level while it cut hours and prices jumped. But Ameri-
can business built a solid framework of expanding profits on the base 
of the rest of the economy's weaknesses. Yet the views of the people 
who lived in the Thirties toward the NRA varied from the clear, cold, 
mountan stream of reality, to the mixed and muddled man-made lake of 
practical politics, to the red-mud Oklahoma creek bf blind miscon-
ceptions. These all ran through the gamut of responses from business, 
consumers, politicians, editorials, and labor. And while these un-
official reactions to the NRA appeared across the nation an official 
body, the National Recovery Review Board, met in Washington to analyze 
the effects of the Blue Eagle. 
After extensive criticisms and political pressure, especially from 
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Senator Gerald Nye of North Dakota, President Roosevelt estabiished 
the National Recovery Review Board in March, 1935. The old radical 
lawyer, Clarence Darrow, chaired this body which met to study the 
effects of the NRA _on business relationships, especially its tendency 
toward fostering monopoly. During the ensuing four months the Review 
Board sat in judgment on thousands of complaints and over thirty codes, 
and finally turned out a three-part report on the Blue Eagle. If the 
Administration expected a white-wash from the coIIllilittee, the Darrow 
Report, as it was called, must have come as a sharp slap in the face. 
The document vehemently attacked the NRA for fostering "those prac-
tices and systems under which one per cent of the nation's population 
has been enabled to possess itself of sixty per cent of the nation's 
wealth," or in other terms, monopoly. The Board declared that in the 
majority of the industries, big business had written the codes and 
administered them, contrary to the interests of the nation and the 
public, solely to attain more power and profits. The Board also be-
lieved that there was a conspiracy to continue these monopolistic 
practices despite the government's knowledge of their existence. In 
fact, the gdvernment had only helped big business consolidation by 
denying government contracts to any industries not adhering to their 
d h ·- 11 . 10 co es, urtJ!ng sma enterprises. The Review Board examined and made 
recommendat:Lons on numerous codes, including that of the petroleum 
industry. Monopoly also had grown in oil, especially in the area of 
marketing where most of the small independents conducted business. 
According to the Report, big oil used the profits it made in one branch 
of the industry (usually pipe lining) to pay for ~ts attack on the in-
dependents in marketing. To promote the reality of fair competition, 
the committee called for the separation of those big oil companies 
which controlled more than one branch of the industry into separate 
businesses for each branch. 11 
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The Administration received the Darrow report with all the friend-
liness of a t.imber rattlesnake. The agency's staff attacked the 
Board's conclusions as innacurate and superficial, and its members 
as socialists and anarchists. Generally, liberal historians (such as 
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr•) have criticized Darrow and his fellow commit-
tee members for their inconsistancies and their ideologies. There 
are obvious irregularities irt the Darrow Report, but they seem to come 
from men whose sympathies lay in the direction of a scoialist economic 
system, trying to make their suggestions fit within a capitalist 
framework. What the members of the Roosevelt executive branch and 
their apologists chose to ignore was the basic truth of the Report's 
argument. The NRA only succeeded in rebuilding business profits; more-
over, industrial control of the making of the codes, their enforce-
ment, and the membership of the federal, state, and local agencies 
made the growth of big business inevitable. 
Besides the Darrow Report, other Leftist cri.tiques of the NRA ap-
peared during its short lifetime. A group of diverse individuals 
whom R. Alan Lawson has called the "independent liberals" (they re-
jected both Marxism and the New Deal) attacked the NRA program for its 
surrender to business influence and its tendency toward a fascist type 
12 
of economics. Further to the left, the Communists and Scoialists 
also leveled their fire at the Blue Eagle. Earl Browder, head of the 
American Communist Party, criticized the NRA for its legalization of 
company unionism and compulsory arbitration as well as its threat to 
65 
the worker's purchasing power. The Socialists, led my Norman Thomas, 
also aimed a cutting critical sword at Roosevelt's program •. At its 
best, the NRA was a return to Hooverian conservatism; at its worst, 
the agency created a big business-government alliance which fixed 
prices, made more profits for industry, and tried to cripple the 
working man and his attempts to organize. 13 
Business, the primary object of much of the Left 1 s objections, 
also reacted strongly to the recovery program. Most businessmen, 
both inside and outside of Oklahoma, favored an extension of the NIRA 
when that subject came before Congress in May, 1935. Such individuals 
and organizations as Charles Fahy, Chairman of the Petroleum Adminis-
trative Board, Samuel Lamport of the Wholesale Dry Goods Institute, 
c. s. Reynolds of the American Trucking.AssociatiC.n, and Arthur Brown 
of the Independent Petroleum Association supported extending the NRA 
for two more years because of its beneficial effects on profits and 
industrial organization. 14 Other industrialists, including H. L. 
Findlay of the National Conference of Bituminous Coal Producers, 
Ward Cheyney of the Industrial and Business Committee for NRA Exten-
sion, and A. M. Greenwood of the Committee of 10,000, also wanted a 
continuance of the NRA only with stronger provisions to protect their 
. 1 . 15 spec1a interests. 
The Chamber of Commerce, a key reflector of conservative, business 
attitudes, and instrumental in the operation of the NRA, called for 
an extension of the program. But, at the same time, that body re-
gistered its disapproval of certain provisions and asked that defi-
finite changes be madein.the new law. The Chamber wanted industry to 
make its own codes, with enforcment handeled at the local level; it 
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asked that the NRA cut its publicity campaign to a bare minimum; and 
most significantly, this body demanded a major revisi.on in Section 7A 
which would have eliminated the closed shop and emasculated union 
organization. Almost a year earlier key members of the Oklahoma City 
Chamber had recorded their reluctance at fully supporting the Blue 
Eagle due to what they called "unconsidered" enforcement of compliance 
coming from unclear federal regulations. 16 
Dissatisfaction with the Chamber in Oklahoma City led to. hesitancy 
within its protege, the National Recovery Committee. At a meeting 
in May, 1934, that latter body expressed its growing unhappiness with 
the Blue Eagle program. Three key members, Victor w. Harlow of Harlow 
Publishing Company, c. F. Myers of Myers Motor Company, and L. A. 
Macklanburg of Macklanburg-Duncan Company, called for the conuni ttee 
to conduct a survey on continued support for the Blue Eagle among the 
city's businessmen. The questioning of eighteen major business 
associations in the city led to some surprising revelations. Eight of 
the groups responded that they were completely satisfied with the NRA 
and its enforcement procedures. These answers varied from generally 
favorable by Mike Monroney of the Oklahoma City Retailers Association, 
to excellent results from Oles Clouse of the Oklahoma City Shoe Re-
tailers Association. Another three respondents generally agreed with 
C. F. Anderson of the Oklahoma Association of lee Industries who 
approved of the NRA but wanted improved enforcement procedures. The 
last five groups felt that the recovery program had been ruinous or 
injurious to their industries, usually because of the wages and hours 
. . 17 provi SJ.OTIS. 
The Nat.ional Recovery Administration was not without its strong 
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business opponents at the national level as well. Leading business 
publications called for an end to the NRA 1 s "bureaucratic tyranny" and 
a return to an economy regulated by its own natural forces. At the 
House hearings on extension of the pr,ogram such individuals and organ-
izations as John E. Edgerton of the Southern States Industrial Council, 
Q• Forrest Walker of R. H. Macy and Company, and the National Retail 
Hardware Association opposed the Blue Eagle, either on philosphical 
grounds or due to the damage it had done their particular group. 18 
Generally, however, business realized that the NRA had done them a 
great service despite the new federal controls on the economy. Even 
with the despised labor provisions, the recovery program had legalized 
monopoly by circumventing the antitrust laws and had reaffirmed the 
primary role of capitalism in American economic life. But other 
interest groups with which the NRA dealt, showed stronger, if varying, 
degrees of dissatisfaction with the program. 
The largest, unorganized body which had gained recognition under 
the NIRA was the consumer. Realizing the need for representation from 
the buying public, the Administration had included a Consumer's Advi-
sory Board in the administrative hierarchy of the NRA. Headed by 
Mary Rumsey, a leading Democrat and friend of many members of the New 
Deal family, and staffed by such individuals as veteran liberal Fred-
eric Howe and economist Gardner C. Means, the C.A.B. tried to represent 
the public interest in a business-dominated organization. Continually 
frustrated by its conservative opponents, the Consumer's group finally 
called for a revision of the recovery program, including a simplifica-
tion of the codes with more protection for the consumer and more public 
power within the code authorities. Without these changes the C.A.B. 
68 
felt that business would continue to run rampant over the interests 
of the majority of Americans. Other consumer groups also registered 
complaints about the Blue Eagle. These organizations wanted better 
enforcement of the sections concerning wages, hdurs, child labor, 
and collective bargaining and an end to those codes which fostered 
monopoly and favored the rich over the poor. 19 Oklahoma's public re-
action ran the gamut from liberal to conservative, with more people 
probably tending toward the latter. Oklahomans either believed that 
they were better off because of the NRA, or wanted less federal in-
tervention at the state and local level, or called the New Deal a 
trial of broken promises and the Blue Eagle, that "despised blue 
20 fowh 11 
The Blue Eagle campaign and the NRA recognized the singularly im-
portant role of women to the nation's economy. Eleanor Roosevelt 
wrote a book in 1933 in which she concluded that the success of the 
New Deal and the NRA depended on the active support of women. Yet 
the fact that she published it under the name Mrs. Franklin D. Roose-
velt indicated the traditional, second class status allocated to 
women by the NRA. Militant feminist groups, such as the Women's Part~ 
deplored the fact that the NRA allowed employers to establish dual 
wage scales for men and women doing the same work. Less radical 
organizations, such as the National Women 1 s Trade Union League, sug-
gested that the recovery program had helped equalize women 1 s wages 
with those of men, but that much more needed to be done. 21 Although 
President Roosevelt had appointed the first woman to a Cabinet post, 
(Frances Perkins as Secretary of Labor), the first woman director of 
the Mint, and the first woman minister to a foreign nation, indica-
ting a type of New Deal for women, the liberation of the fairer sex 
did not come with the National Recovery Administration. 
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Blacks also caught the eye of the Blue Eagle and merited special, 
if segregated, treatment during this publicity campaign. Blacks had 
suffered even more than the rest of the public ~s a result of the 
depression; unemployment among Black workers was thirty to sixty per 
cent higher than among white counterparts. Besides normal American 
racial attitudes, Blacks largely worked in particularly depressed 
industries such as construction and bituminous coal and frequently 
were unskilled, always the first to be laid off in times of economic 
illness. Blacks needed a recovery program badly, but the NRA failed 
to provide them with jobs or minimize racial discrimination. A minor 
victory had been won when the Administration prohibited racial and 
geographical wage differentials, despite the requests of Southern 
businessmen. But, as usual, the Blue Eagle's actions sang a different 
tune than did their words. Where wages were kept on an equal basis, 
white employers hired Blacks last and fired them first. Businessmen 
accomplished displacement of Black workers on an informal, individual 
basis. But some communities, such as Tulsa, formalized this through 
laws prohibiting Black employment in certain trades or in certain 
sections of the community. Besides this type of discrimination, many 
businesses blatantly evaded equal wages, and the NRA rarely enforced 
the law. (Of 155,000 cases recorded at· the state level, about 1500 
reached the national office, and only 564 were taken into court.) 
Blacks became so dissatisfied with the Blue Eagle, that they called it 
the "Negro Removal Act. 11 The disgruntlement of Blacks became visible 
in Oklahoma City very early. A committee of three Negroes appeared 
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before the city's NRA committee in August, 1933 and complained of 
racial discrimination. According to this group, the Blue Eagle cam-
paign resulted in Black workers being fired and replaced with whites. 
The Black delegates leveled specific charges at Sears, Roebuck, and 
Company, and accused the Chamber of Commerce of encouraging the prac-
tice of racism. Stanley Draper of the Chamber denied that discrimina-
tion against Blacks permeated Oklahoma's economic system as it did the 
f h . ' 22 rest o t e nation s. The Great Depression brought even greater 
hardship to Blacks than to white Americans, and the NRA did even less 
to help that group than it had for others more accepted and: moee pow-
erful. 
Lastly the NRA directly influenced both organized and unorganized 
labor. Unionism, or the attempt to give the workingman a viable and 
powerful voice with which he could carry complaints to his employers, 
had been a part of the American economic system since the Knights of 
Labor in the 1870 1 s. Organized labor had struggled for over a half 
century against industry, and its partners, federal, state and local 
governments, just to obtain the legal right to exist. A long, uphill 
fight, the major battles seemed to be won by the end of World War I. 
By 1919-1920 over four million workers belonged to the largest Ameri-
can labor union, the American Federation of Labor, and during those 
two years labor struck over seven thousand times. Yet in the next 
ten years unionism went into a tailspin, bringing it to a low point 
unmatched except:in _the earliest years of its existence. Membership 
in the A. F. of L. fell to a low of -2f8 milliqn in 1926 and strikes 
bottomed at 629 in 1928. 23 A ntnn.ber of factors precipitated this 
decline which only slowed after the NRA became law and did not halt 
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until the Congress passed the Wagner Act in 1935. A key problem 
plagued the organization of the A. F. of L.: the weakness and con-
servatism of its leadership stifled any efforts at organizing outside 
the traditional trade or craft union structure. Unionism regained 
its lost status only after John Lewis's Congress of Industrial Organ-
ization swept into the unorganized, mass production fields. The 
prosperous economic scene also made organizing difficult; and busi-
ness expansion grew largely in unorganized industries. The actions 
of business also militated against union success. Employers worked 
against organized labor by granting greater benefits to non-union 
workers, undercutting the basic purpose for organization. Where 
unions had gained a foothold, business moved against its workers in 
full force. Using such anti-union devices as the yellow dog con-
tract, court injunctions, blacklisting, spies, company police and com-
pany unions, employers methodically, vehemently, and successfully 
attacked unions, their rank and file, and their organizers. 24 
At this point in the turbulent years of American labor, Franklin 
Roosevelt, the New Deal, and the NRA thundered onto the political 
scene. The National Recovery Administration carried the promise of 
Section 7A and a new hope for unionism; but those seeds of promise 
and. hope fell on unfertile ground and grew only with great difficulty. 
Section 7A granted labor the right ta organize without interference 
from their employers. Yet the Blue Eagle failed to clarify the means 
of determining representation and the duty of employers to deal with 
these representative bodies. Business blatantly ignored the provisions 
of the law, and the govermnent· aided their cause by doing little to 
enforce the NIRA in the federal courts. Clearly, the federal recovery 
program was not labor's "Magna Carta," as William Green, President 
of the A. F. of L., had described it two years earlier. 25 
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But, the Blue Eagle did provide unions with a psychological boost 
which added members to its ranks and militancy to its attitude. Com-
mantled by a Sm.all army of Communists, Socialists, Trotskyites, and 
other leftists,union organizers invaded the large, mass production 
industries. In 1934 these leftist-led unions walked off their jobs 
in three major strikes. The walkouts by auto workers in Toledo, Ohio, 
by longshoremen on the West Coast, and by truckers in Minneapolis 
established the framework for all later major victories. But unions 
could not have achieved those victories without a more substantive 
law than the NIRA. This came with the Wagner Act of 1935. After 
the New York Senator's bill became law work stoppages involving or-
ganized labor climbed from 400 in 1933 to 100 in 1934 to 2500 in 1937, 
d . b h" k k d 1 . ·11· k 26 an union mem ers ip s y-roc ete to near y six mi ion wor ers. 
In May, 1935 organized workers struck the Wilson Packing plant in 
Oklahoma City illustrating labor's renewed militant spirit and the 
failure of the NRA to protect working men's rights. The strike formed 
a microcosm of nearly all the major labor struggles since the 1880 1 s 
and clearly demonstrated that labor's New Deal came with the Wagner 
Act, not the Nl.A. 27 
The Amalgamated Meat Cutte~s and Butcher:.Workmen 1 s Union, an 
affiliate of the A. F. of L., and the Wilson Company Meat Packing 
plant had a prolonged antagonistic history both in Oklahoma City and 
across the nation. The Amalgamated, the city's second largest union, 
had attacked Wilson all across the organizational front in an attempt 
to obtain national and local recognition as sole bargaining agent for 
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28 the company's workers. In June 1934, the Oklahoma City local went 
on an eight day walkout and obtained Wilson's commitment to recognize 
the union as a bargaining representative. However, after a year of 
frustrating dealings with the company, the Amalgamated sent an open 
letter of complaint.to Wilson, threatening a strike if these grie-
vances were not settled. According to the letter, the workers had 
six conditions which the company must improve: (1) Wilson had 
refused to recognize seniority rights; (2) it had failed to grant the 
right of collective bargaining; (3) it had insulted and ignored the 
union's grievance committee; (4) company foremen had sought to destroy 
the union; (5) Wilson had spread false rtnnors about an impending strike; 
and (6) the company had discussed fomenting a stike in order to crush 
the union. The local plant manager, w. w. Martin, irrnnediately de-
nied these charges and blamed the trouble on union agitation. 29 The 
stage was now set for an eight month battle finally ending in a union 
victory but without the help of the NRA. 
Like all: strikes, the one at Wilson and Company passed through a 
series of steps from a verbal to active to inactive before both sides 
came to an agreement. In the first step the union and the packers 
used rhetoric to justify their position and attack that of their 
opponents. The Amalgamated claimed that it did not want to strike but 
its grievances were just and the Company must meet them. Gomer Smith, 
counsel for the union, charged that the packer's trust had conspired 
to crush the Amalgamated on a nationwide scale and already had ignored 
several of the NRA's rulings on labor relations. Edmund Foss Wilson, 
President of Wilson and Company, disclaimed any violation of the 1934 
agreement; and w. W. Martin stated that the doors of his office always 
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were open to his workers and that he would act on any responsible 
1 . 30 comp aint. Both sides had drawn the lines, both had stated the 
rightousness of their cause, and that made early sett~ment most 
difficult. 
Union organizers feared the results of a strike during such hard 
times; so many hungered for any type of job. The Amalgamated hoped 
that a walkout could be averted through the offices of the National 
Recovery Administration. At the union's request, Blue Eagle repre-
sentative Dr. Edwin A. Elliott arrived in the city on May 24 to mediate 
the conflict. Although the Supreme Court had killed the NRA by the 
end of the~.month, Dr. Elliott had been completely unsuccessful in get-
ting the two sides together. Wilson and Company refused to recognize 
his right to arbitrate the dispute. The organizers also appealed to 
the Chamber of Commerce's labor relations committee but that group 
refused to interfere at any time before or during the strike. Early 
in June, J. C. Howard, from the Department of Labor, had no more sue-
cess at negotiations; this left the Amalgamated with no choice but to 
walkout or suffer a disastrous defeat. 31 The NRA 1 s roll at the early 
stage was small but very significant. The agency had failed on other 
occasions to enforce its labor decisions against Wilson which made the 
company's reaction inevitable. The recovery law had established or-
ganized labor's rights to collective bargaining but the NRA's business 
leadership did little to see that industry obeyed those laws. The 
Blue Eagle's failure at arbitration directly influenced the strike in 
Oklahoma City. It also created an atmosphere which preserved Wilson's 
ability to battle organized labor to a standstill. 
On June 4, after a vote of 381-13, 375 members of the Amalgamated 
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Meat Cutters walked out of the Wilson plant, beginning one of Oklahoma 
City's longest strikes. The union's strategy included a picket line, 
physical and verbal discouragement of strike breaking, anti-company 
prop'aganda, and a boycott of Wilson products. The latter was the most 
successful as the Amalgamated persuaded its own members and those of 
the Retail Clerk's, Oil Worker's, and Electrical Workers' unions to 
back the boycott. Later the city's Trades and Labor Council accepted 
the ban on Wilson meats, aligning 14,000 laborers with the strikers. 
Organizers eventually appealed directly to the consumers not to buy 
the products and then expanded the boycott statewide. Although Wilson 
denied the fact, even the Chamber admitted that the boycott proved 
extremely effective in the city. The union showed remarkable restraint 
in its use of anti-company violence. Very few battles occurred between 
strike breakers and pickets; on one occasion the Amalgamated even went 
so far as to sing hymns to workers as they left the plant. 32 
Wilson and Company blasted the strikers with all the traditional 
weapons that had been employed against organized labor for years. The 
packers verbally assaulted the union and its cause, denouncing the 
walkout as the work of out-of-state, communist agitators; they also 
accused the unions of excessive violence against non-union workers. 
Wilson hired strike breakers, mostly Blacks to run the plant; they then 
claimed that the plant was operating at full production, denying that 
the strike adversely affected them. However, at the same time they took 
out large ads in the local newspapers proclaiming the justice of their 
cause and urging striking employees to return to work. Simultaneously, 
the company issued an ultimatum warning the strikers that their jobs 
would be filled if they did not immediately return to work. 33 
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Wilson had some very strong allies in the agencies of the community, 
the goverrunent, and especially the Chamber of Commerce. The Chamber 
investigated the Amalgamated, employing at least one spy, and reported 
to the company concerning possible communist influei'ices. That body, 
which had been so influential in the local NRA, also actively worked 
34 
against the union's boycott of Wilson products. Two of the city's 
three newspapers carried anti-union editorials at various times and in 
. . d b' d . 35 some instances printe iase stories. The city police kept a very 
close watch on union activities and hired numerous new deputies to 
handle potential violence. The Amalgamated later accused the police 
of trying to break the strike by arresting key labor leaders. Though 
the union's report was obviously biased, it fit a long history of 
anti-labor activity on the part of various police agencies across the 
nation. And, of those arrested for violence during the strike, twenty-
one belonged to the union, while only five served as strike breakers. 
The Governor's office even got involved:in the dispute; E. W. Marland 
warned the strikers against further violence, kept the National Guard 
in a state of readiness, and stated his willingness to use them if 
36 things got out of hand. 
Despite having to fight a war on two fronts, against the company 
and against the goverrunent, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters held their 
picket lines for over eight months. Appealing first to the NRA and 
then to the Departmentof Labor, the strikers and the federal agencies 
failed to force Wilson to bargain with the union. Finally, after Con-
gress passed the Wagner Act in July 1935, union organizers took their 
case before the National Labor Relations Board. There the strikers 
won recognition of the Amalgamated as the collective bargaining agent 
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for Wilson plants throughout the United States, and the Oklahoma City 
strike quietly ended. 37 Why did Wilson accept arbitration by and the 
decision of the Wagner Board when it had not accepted those of the 
NRA? The Blue Eagle repeatedly had demonstrated that its flights 
favored business over organized labor. The packers sensed no pres-
sure from the recovery agency and knew that precedent supported 
Wilson's position. But the company knew that the federal government 
would back the NLRB; besides, the company preferred recognition of an 
affiliate of the conservative A. F. of L. to one of the many, more 
radical groups organizing under the new c. I. O. 
Organized labor, consumers, small businessmen, and the public felt 
the extensive effects of the National Recovery Administration. Un-
fortunately for these depressed groups and individuals, that influence 
did as much harm as good. Only big business gained significant ad-
vantages from the Blue Eagle through its increased profits and 
especially through its new alliance with the federal government. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION: THE EAGLE'S LEGACY 
At high noon on Monday, May 27, 1935, the nine justices of the 
United States Supreme Court met to decide the fate of the NRA, and 
possibly the entire New Deal. On April 1 the Second Circuit Court 
of New York had ruled in favor of the Blue Eagle in the case of United 
States v. ~·1·~· Schechter Poultry Corporation. The NRA stood be-
fore the court of the last resort to hear if its actions of the last 
two years were constitutional. Tension clung to the room like a heavy 
ocean fog as the nine justices filed in to take their places at the 
bench. After quickly killing the Frazier-Lemke farm mortgage act, 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes began to read the Schecter decision. 
By a unanimous vote the Court declared the National Industrial Recovery 
Act unconstitutional. The Chief Justice based the ruling on two points: 
first, the legislature had delegated some of its power to the executive 
branch illegally; and second, the law interpreted the interstate com-
merce clause much broader than its constitutional limits permitted. 1 
Yet, in many ways, because of its pro-business organization and its 
conservative leadership, the recovery program never really lived. The 
nine "old men" had not destroyed the NRA; rather, it had destroyed it-
self by failure to promote economic rehabilitation, establish industrial 
ethics, protect the consumer, and give organized labor its place in the 
sun, all responsibilities of the Blue Eagle's leaders. 
The principal program of the New Deal had not solved the problems 
of its own bureaucracy nor the difficulties of a seriously ill economic 
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system. Business profits climbed but so did prices; wages constantly 
remained below the cost of living. The NRA hardly touched the morass 
of unemployment; millions were still out of work and many were turning 
to more radical solutions, ones that apparently had succeeded in Fas-
cist Italy and Communist Russia. Yet the NRA's failure had been almost 
inevitable from its beginning because the Administration had refused to 
make any fundamenta 1 changes in the economic structure. 
Beginning in 1933 the NRA's organization and leadership had been 
too conservative. Unfortunately, the national agency had selected its 
leaders almost completely from among businessmen and industrialists. 
General Hugh Johnson and his co-workers had enough foresight to see the 
benefits business-government cooperation could create; they were also 
aware that this method would preserve capitalism in the United States. 
At the state and local level the Blue Eagle searched for its leaders 
among trade associations and Chambers of Commerce. Oklahoma City 
clearly illustrated this. Ancel Earp, insurance man, Mrs. J. J. Volz, 
woman's club president, Victor N. Harlow, publisher, all of these in-
dividuals came from the city's powerful business elite. The city's 
Chamber gave its full support to the NRA effort, recognizing that the 
right people controlled the recovery committees. The Chamber's leaders 
quickly realized the possiblities of a national organization such as 
the NRA. Initially the new relationship, as well as increased appro-
priations, established a medium for more effective lobbying by local 
leaders at the federal level. Men who served in the Chamber and the 
NRA continuously pushed for public works money; these appropriations 
included enough money to pay for flood control at Fort Reno on the 
2 North Canadian River. Besides more money, the city's leaders hoped 
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that the NRA might be used to further the interests of Oklahoma City. 
First, using the Blue Eagle campaign, the Chamber focused the attention 
of the eight southwestern states on Oklahoma City as a great interior 
. 3 
wholesale and retail market and distributor. 'lhus it promoted the 
city as a regional headquarters for NRA~affiliated trade associations, 
and as a vita 1 urban center of the future. 4 
The recovery agency employed methods which showed a conservative 
influence. Codemaking became an exercise in big business regulation of 
big business. Industrial leaders formed institutes or joined associ-
ations, wrote their own codes of fair competition, and then easily ob-
tained their adoption. And when the NRA created governing boards for 
a particular industry, business leaders carried a majority vote. 'lhus, 
the NRA resulted in an increase in business consolidation and power 
at the expense of the small entreprenuer, the consuming public, and 
organized labor. 'lhe increasing importance of a conservative, big 
business-government alliance proved most successful in Oklahoma's 
vital petroleum industry. Beginning with legalized monopoly under 
the NRA, Big Oil has consolidated on a continual basis, until many 
feel that competition barely exists today and has virtually no bearing 
on prices, and that so-called federal regulation has become a means 
of masking unfair trade practices and exhorbitant prices. 
'lhe Great Depression created the atmosphere for a significant 
change in American economic attitudes. But Roosevelt's recovery pro-
gram only altered the surface and left the framework and foundation 
unchanged. 'lhe time was also ripe for rearranging the social and 
political realities of certain groups of individuals. The Administra-
tion recognized the power of women as consumers and made special 
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appeals to them during the Blue Eagle campaign. Yet, despite Roose-
velt 1 s appointments of women to key political posts and the position 
of Eleanor Roosevelt as possibly the greatest American woman of the 
Twentieth Century, the recovery agency and other New Deal programs 
still viewed women as second class citizens. Just one example of this 
was the fact that the recovery codes established wage differentials 
for women. The feminist movement declined rapidly after 1930, the 
appearances of New Deal reform taking away the wind of the argument 
f 1 . h 5 or equa rig ts. 
The Blue Eagle brought hope to another group which had suffered 
at the hands of a biased economic system. When the NRA refused to 
allow differences in wages on a geographic basis, Blacks rejoiced at 
the possibility of equal pay, especially in the South. But appearances 
proved false ·here as well. Blacks remained the last hired with the 
worst pay and the first fired. The complaint against Sears and the 
Chamber of Commerce registered by Oklahoma City's relatively small 
Black corrnnunity (only about 170,000 state-wide) clearly illustrated 
this fact. 6 The "Negro Removal Act" was not the first, nor would it 
be the last time that rhetoric raised the.hopes of the Black community 
only to have those hopes dashed by reality. 
Organized labor also felt more hopeful after the birth of the 
Eagle. Section 7A legalized something which had been won in tl:ie past 
only with blood. Guaranteed collective bargaining seemed to open the 
gates of a union paradise where all working men received high pay and 
worked decent hours under safe conditions. But organized labor's 
fight had not ended. Management reluctantly- accepted 7A and then 
twisted its meaning to suit their own ends. Business had no intention 
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of granting any power to the unions, nor of allowing them to act as 
;1 
bargaining agents for industrial employees. Company unions, black-
lists, and strike breakers remained active tools of anti-union busi-
nessmen, such as Wilson and Company of Oklahoma City. The failure of 
Section 7A left organized labor only one alternative, the strike, 
which the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen finally voted 
for in 1935. Section 7A 1 s benefits to the union movement were very 
questionable, though it did legalize collective bargaining. Possibly 
the success and power of such NRA supporters as the Chamber of Commerce 
has been significant in keeping the road rough for brganized labor in 
Oklahoma since the 1930 1 s. 
If the NRA shorted union members, Blacks, and women, then the 
consuming public also must have suffered. As the national income had 
increased so had prices, only at a faster rate. World War II eventual-
ly aleviated the economic suffering of most Americans. Changing the 
post-New Deal power structure proved more difficult. The alliance 
between business and goverrunent established a power bloc which an un-
organized consurning public could never defeat. The Consumer's Advisory 
Board tried to protect the people's interests but felt increasingly 
frustrated. Industry's sympathizers successfully blocked the C.A.B. 
at every corner; the latter finally called for a complete revision of 
the recovery program. A revision in the powerful business-goverrunent 
bloc never came. This alliance grew stronger through the world con-
flict of the 1940 1 s and the tensions of the Cold War that followed. 
The power-bloc became closely relatedtr; the defense industry, and this 
military-industrial complex rapidly dominated many of the principal 
sectors of the economy. In fact, the alliance had become so strong 
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by 1960 that even conservative, Republican President Dwight Eisenhower 
warned the nation against it. 
If there was dissatisfaction among various groups within the 
Administration and outside the administrative structure, why did they 
not voice their protests? The answer is complex, but the particular 
style of the Blue Eagle's appeal provides one vital reason. Patrio-
tism has always been singularly important to a nation's survival, but 
the NRA 1 s organizers linked the ideate the survival of a political 
institution rather than the nation's highest ideals. The agency 
labeled what the President said, what General Johnson said, the re-
covery program, the New Deal, everything the government did as the 
only patiortic method of governing. Dissenters held no monopoly on 
truth then or now, but without them a democracy could not function nor 
could the human errors naturally committed by the government be exposed 
and corrected. By describing those conservatives, liberals and radi-
cals who opposed the NRA as un-American, the Administration effectively 
undercut their opposition and ended all possibility that constructive 
criticism might have changed the recovery agency into an effective 
regulatory body. 
The Blue Eagle also gained acceptance and most of the public re-
jected other solutions because of the basic conservativism of the 
American people. Americans, and especially Oklahomans, have been 
particularly conscious of their individualistic economic tradition 
and extremely afraid of governmental intervention. Most forms of 
econom:C planning have looked too much like some variety of socialism, 
an American nightmare that is still denounced regularly in The Daily 
Oklahoman. (This red scare is the reason so many companies, such as 
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Wilson, directed their anti-union propaganda campaigns at the threat 
of outside, communist agitation; they read the public's attitude per-
fectly.) Yet, despite this ingrained opposition to fundamental econ-
omic change, Franklin D. Roosevelt could have made those alterations, 
and created a new political future for millions of Americans. Instead, 
Roosevelt was too aware of his popularity, and therefore proposed 
such programs as the NRA, a program in the worst tradition of American 
reforms. These types of reforms helped business consolidate at the 
expense of th.e :public 1 s fundamental interest, a powerful voice in the 
workings of the conomic and political system. 
If all this is true, why then have so many many historians, 
nationally and regionally, praised the New Deal as a liberal group 
of laws and agencies benefiting the individual? Roosevelt's rhetoric 
and even some of his programs promised reforms that would help the 
public; but that should not over-shaodw the fact that the principal 
early New Deal agency, the National Recovery Administration, promo-
ted conservative business interests. Historians have failed to un-
derstand the basic fact that has been pointed out by some of the more 
radical elements in the political and intellectual community: liber-
al reform in the United States has been led by conservative men and 
had conservative results. This definitely was proven by the case of 
the Blue Eagle's flight across the nation and its nesting in Oklaho-
ma. 
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